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STANDING TO INTERVENE
CARL TOBIAS*

I.. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has rarely considered what applicants must
show to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a)(2) since the Court amended the provision in 1966. 1 This dearth
of Supreme Court treatment has meant that primary responsibility for
interpreting Rule 24(a)(2) has devolved upon the lower federal courts.
Many of these courts and numerous commentators have recognized
that it is very difficult to identify precisely what the Rule demands of
those that seek to intervene of right. During much of the last quarter
century, however, the federal judiciary agreed about one important
proposition: Rule 24(a)(2) does not require that intervention applicants
possess standing to sue. An increasing number of circuit and district
courts, however, recently demanded or suggested that applicants have
an "interest" greater than, or equal to, that necessary for standing or
comply with certain standing requirements. Indeed, in 1986, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the "Courts of Appeals have reached
varying conclusions as to whether a party seeking to intervene as of
right must himself possess standing." 2 The Court, nonetheless, expressly declined to decide whether an applicant "must satisfy not only
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Susan Bandes, Bob Bone,
Bill Luneburg, Rick Marcus, Rick Matasar and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Margaret Bentwood, Peggy Hesse and Tom Orr for valuable research assistance, Cecelia Palmer
for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that
remain are mine.
1. Rule 24(a)(2) provides in pertinent part:
(a} Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action:
... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
Rule 24(a)(2) governs non-statutory intervention of right. Rule 24(a)( I) covers statutory intervention of right, when Congress prescribes intervention of right in substantive legislation,
and Rule 24(b) applies to permissive intervention, intervention which courts have discretion
to grant. FED. R. C1v. P. 24.
2. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 n. 21 (1986).
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the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Article
III." 3
The Court's reserv:ation of the question for future decision and
the increasing disagreement among lower federal courts regarding the
relevance of standing to intervention have created confusion in the
application of Rule 24(a)(2). The courts' interpretations have complicated, and even precluded, participation in lawsuits by certain applicants; particularly public interest litigants, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the
Sierra Club. The treatment has prevented affected interests from being
heard, while the federal judiciary has lost helpful expertise, information
and perspectives needed to make the best substantive decisions. The
invocation of standing in the intervention of right context has been
inadvisable, and its effects recently have worsened. Until the Supreme
Court resolves the question of standing's relevance to intervention of
right, litigants increasingly will ask that federal courts find standing
applicable to Rule 24(a)(2), and these requests will engender greater
uncertainty, cost, and hardship. It is important, therefore, to analyze
this issue.
The first section of this Article explores the background and judicial application of standing to sue and the history of intervention of
right. The ideas have different origins and serve dissimilar purposes,
although both implicate what entities need to participate in litigation.
Standing basically entails what a plaintiff must demonstrate to initiate
suit and Article Ill's requirement that there be a case or controversy
between the parties. In comparison, intervention of right involves what
an absentee must show to participate in ongoing litigation, as to which
the plaintiff has standing and whose resolution may prejudice the applicant, and Rule 24{a)(2)'s requirements that an applicant have an
inadequately represented interest which will be impaired.
The secon~ part assesses the enforcement of Rule 24(a)(2) since
its revision in 1966. The federal judiciary has experienced considerable
difficulty in delineating exactly what applicants must demonstrate to
intervene of right, but few courts have mentioned standing. Over the
last decade, a growing number of judges has insisted that applicants
possess an interest more substantial than, or identical to, that necessary
for standing or satisfy various standing requirements. That enforcement
has restricted, and occasionally prevented, the participation of public
interest litigants and has deprived courts of valuable input. Until the
Supreme Court resolves the issue, plaintiffs and defendants increasingly
3. Id. at 69.
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will request that judges consider standing relevant to intervention of
right, and this will create mounting confusion, expense and hardship.
The third section analyzes the opinions of those courts that have
stated or suggested that standing implicates Rule 24(a)(2). The federal
judiciary has provided little justification for the invocation of standing,
and the Rule's history, language and underlying policies lend minimal
support to such application. Moreover, the evaluation shows that the
standing and intervention inquiries essentially are, and should remain,
discrete. The courts; therefore, should sharply circumscribe their reliance on standing. These conclusions do not necessarily mean that
standing is wholly irrelevant. Indeed, standing is critical to intervention
of right in one sense: the policies that underlie sta~ding help. to define
the idea of a case and to identify appropriate parties to participate in
litigation. A case is a vehicle for facilitating the federal judiciary's performance of its quintessential responsibilities-explicating public values in the Constitution and statutes and requiring compliance with
them by governmental entities. The party structure of a case, accordingly, should include litigants that can facilitate the efficacious discharge
of these judicial duties.
The final part of the Article offers suggestions for future application
of standing to Rule 24(a}(2). The segment recasts intervention of right
jurisprudence, drawing on transformed conceptualizations of the idea
of a case and of the federal judiciary's role in public' law litigation. The
approach is a pragmatic, fair, and sensitive adjustment of the traditional
intervention mechanism to the practicalities of modem litigation. Its
implementation should enable courts to improve their substantive decisionmaking and achieve judicial economy.
'
II. PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND THE "LIBERALIZATION" OF
ST ANDING AND INTERVENTION

Many developments, certain of which are interrelated, occurred
throughout the twentieth century that implicate standing and intervention of right. 4 A number of these events led to the transformation
of considerable federal civil litigation and to new ways of conceptual4. See Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
270, 271-96 (1989). From approximately the mid-l960s until the late 1970s,
the federal judiciary "liberalized" standing and intervention of right in the sense of being
more willing to permit participation in litigation by entities that sought to initiate suit or
intervene in cases. Since around 1980, courts generally have been less willing to grant standing
or intervention and have invoked standing in the intervention of right context specifically
to limit intervention. The restrictions on standing and intervention appear primarily to be
responses to the litigation explosion, but they also may reflect a lack of solicitude for pu.blic
interest litigants or the interests they seek to vindicate in litigation.
CORNELL L. REV.
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izing standing and intervention between the mid-l 960s and the midl 970s. 5 This part initially examines those general developments most
important to standing and intervention of right and then considers the
background and judicial application of standing and the history of intervention of right.
A. Growth and Development of Public Law Litigation

From approximately 1965 to 1975, a multitude of developments
altered the nature of much federal civil litigation and the understandings of what entities seeking to institute or intervene in these lawsuits
needed to show. Public interest litigants increased their participatiop
in federal cases, and public law litigation grew. Federal judges created
novel substantive rights and expanded those previously recognized,
while they were more receptive to citizen involvement in agency proceedings and courtroom litigation. Congress enacted "social" legislation
that fostered such participation by the statutes' intended beneficiaries.
Public interest litigants capitalized on certain aspects of the equitybased Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that facilitated their involvement in lawsuits, and courts applied the Rules in ways that were solicitous of these parties' needs.
Public interest litigants are individuals or groups that pursue in
the administrative sphere or in the courtroom rights and interests of
unrepresented persons adversely affected by the activities oflarge public
or private entities. 6 Public interest litigants differ in several important
respects from parties they typically oppose, such as the government
and members of regulated industries, namely corporations. 7 Nearly all
public interest litigants have considerably less time and money to spend
than their opponents, and the resource deficiencies of numerous public
·interest litigants, such as civil rights plaintiffs, can make them riskaverse. 8
The most significant precursors of modern public interest litigants-the NAACP, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and
legal aid offices created to furnish urban poor persons with legal ser5. See id. at 279-87; Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party
Joinder, 65 N.C.L. REV. 745, 754-57 ( 1987).
6. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 745 n.I, 756; Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public
Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in
Administrative Proceedings, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 906, 941-45 (1982). See generally N. ARON,
LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL PUBLIC INTEREST LAw IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND (1989).
7. Public interest litigants typically oppose regulated industries in public interest
litigation, but the litigants may oppose government in all forms of public law litigation. See
infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
8. See Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485, 49598 (1988-89) (civil rights plaintiffs); N. ARON, supra note 6, at 52-62 (public interest litigants).
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vices-pursued civil lawsuits in the early twentieth century. 9 It was not
until the 1960s, however, that these entities and today's public interest
litigants, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), became actively involved in the kinds of cases that typify modern public
law suits. 10
The rights and interests that public interest litigants normally seek
to vindicate are relatively intangible, abstract, ideological, collective or
public in character, such as concern for liberty or air quality. These
often contrast markedly with other parties' rights and interests, which
are concrete, common law, individual or private in nature, such as real
property or a contract. 11 Public interest litigants also provide unique
expertise, information and perspectives and the input of public interest
litigants can improve administrative and judicial decisionmaking. 12
Public law litigation comprises lawsuits that vindicate significant
social values affecting large numbers of people. 13 Many aspects of this
litigation are unlike traditional private, two-party cases. For instance,
the subject matter of public law litigation may be the practices or polici~s of enormous units of government or multinational corporations,
while the cases can be exceedingly complex, involving hundreds of
issues and thousands of parties. 14
"Institutional reform" litigation was one important form of public
law litigation experiencing considerable growth between 1965 and
197 5. 15 Institutional suits seek to improve the operation of substantial
agencies or governmental institutions, such as prisons and schools. 16
Another type of public law litigation increasing considerably both dur9. See COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE
21-57 (1976); Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 207, 209-24 ( 1976).
10. See Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1439-41 (1984); Rabin,
supra note 9, at 212, 216-17.
11. See Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 282-83 (1990); Tobias,
supra note 4, at 323-25.
12. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 941-45 (agency decisionmaking); Tobias, supra note
· 4, at 329 (judicial decisionmaking).
13. The classic treatment is Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). See also Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. I (1979).
14. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 1989)
(police lieutenants' examination as subject matter); Geier v. Richardson, 871 F.2d 1310,
1311, 1315-17 (6th Cir. 1989) (complex party structure); opinions in In re "Agent Orange
Product Liability Litigation," 611 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (complex issues); see also
Chayes, supra note 13, at 1302.
15. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 279-82; see also Chayes, supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 344 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Fallon,

Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, ·
59 N.Y.U.L. REV. I n.I (1984). For more discussion of the litigation's characteristics, see
Tobias, supra note 4, at 279-82.
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ing that time and since is "public interest litigation." 17 These cases
vindicate the political, moral or ideological interests of many individuals in trying to guarantee proper governmental decisionmaking. 18 A
prototypical, and the predominant, kind of public interest litigation
challenges administrative determinations of federal agencies. Many of
these suits now have at least a tri-polar party structure, which typically
includes the government, public interest litigants, and regulated interests or their representatives, such as trade associations.
When resolving public law suits, judges assume different roles than
in private litigation. Perhaps most important, they give substantive
content to public norms in constitutional or statutory provisio,ns that
underlie the cases and attempt to prevent or correct inappropriate governmental behavior. 19 Judges also manage the litigation more closely
in several ways. In institutional reform cases, for example, courts may
undertake major responsibility for fact-gathering, even appointing adjuncts such as special masters, to fulfill what essentially are "quasilegislative" or "quasi-administrative" decisional duties. 20
The expansion of public law litigation resulted from numerous
factors, including the federal judiciary's recognition of new substantive
rights, its extension of those rights formerly recognized, as well as
courts' flexible application of procedural requirements and increased
control over the civil litigation process. 21 The Supreme Court broadly
interpreted the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, developing, for instance, the concept of "New
17. The litigation differs from institutional reform litigation in some respects. See
Tobias, supra note 4, at 282. Recent examples of public interest litigation are Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 317 (1990); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491
U.S. 440 (1989).
18. The classic treatment is Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The
Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. Rev. 1033 (1968). Cf. Tobias, supra
note 4, at 282-83 (more discussion of litigation's characteristics).
19. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ci. 625 (1990); see also Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1093, 1095 (1984).
20. See. e.g., Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98 F.R.D. 11 (E.D. Tex. 1982); see also Brazil,
Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 394 ( 1986).
Another conceptualization of "managerial judging," which partially responds to the
"litigation explosion," involves close judicial supervision of civil lawsuits not only before
trial but even from filing to disposition. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007 (!st Cir. 1988). See also Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case
Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. Rev. 70
(f981); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. Rev. 374 (1982). The litigation explosion
is the perception that a substantial number of civil cases are filed, too many of which lack
merit or exploit procedural mechanisms for tactical advantage. See Tobias, supra note 4, at
287-92 (more discussion of managerial judging and litigation explosion).
21. See Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. Rev. 1
(1984); Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. Rev. 494
(1986).
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Property." 22 The Supreme Court and lower federal courts also evinced
enhanced receptivity to public participation in administrative proceedings and courtroom litigation 23 by, for example, enforcing the Federal Rules in ways that promoted public interest litigants' active involvement in civil cases. 24
Federal legislative activity contributed to a number of the developments. 25 From the mid-l 960s to the mid-l 970s, Congress passed
many statutes that certain observers dubbed "social regulation" or "social legislation." 26 Some statutes were intended to improve the environment or to protect consumers, while other measures were meant to
rectify discrimination. 27 Congress bestowed substantive rights and procedural advantages-such as liberalized standing and intervention, lenient burdens of proof, and reduced requirements for securing attorney's fees-on intended beneficiaries that Congress anticipated would
vindicate the statutory interests by participating in agency processes or
litigation. 28
The equity-premised Federal Rules and the federal courts' generous application of them were important to these developments. 29 In
the first decade of the twentieth century, growing dissatisfaction with
common law and code practice and procedure led some leaders of the
bench and bar to advocate change. Support for reform gradually increased, and after decades of controversy, Congress enacted the Rules
22. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equal protection);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (new property).
23. The classic cases were Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. I 966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608,
615-17 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 362-69 ( 1972).
24. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
25. See Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189,
1278-95 (1986); Tobias, supra note 4, at 784-85.
26. For treatment of "social regulation," see Vogel, The "New" Social Regulation
in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HisTORICAL
EssAYS 155 (T. McGraw ed. 1981); Lilley & Miller, The New "Social Regulation", 47 Pus.
INTEREST 49 (Spring 1977).
27. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 433134 (1988); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-83 (1988); Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-el7 (1988).
28. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988) (citizen suit provision); Marek
v. Chesny, 473 U.S. I, 43 (1985) (Appendix to opinion ofBrennan, J., dissenting)( compilation
of fee-shifting legislation).
29. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 272-76, 285-87. For analysis of the developments
that led to the Rules' promulgation in 1938, I rely on Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a
Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure From The Field Code to the Federal Rules,
89 CoLUM. L. REv. I (I 989); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1014 (1982); Resnik, supra note 21; Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
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Enabling Act of 1934. 30 That legislation empowered the Supreme Court
to adopt procedural rules for civil litigation in the federal trial courts
·that became effective in 1938. 31
The Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules had numerous
objectives for the Rules as a whole and as to specific procedural areas
and rules. 32 The Committee favored resolution of disputes on the merits and non-technical procedural approaches, evidenced by provision
for liberal pleading, open-ended discovery, and substantial attorney and
party control over litigation, especially prior to trial. 33 The drafters'
decision to merge equity and law was particularly important. 34 This
meant that equity, not common law, was the source of the Rules' underlying philosophy, while the Rules even exceeded equity's permissiveness and flexibility in pleading, discovery and joinder. 35 It is impossible to discern whether the Advisory Committee that wrote the
Federal Rules in the mid-l 930s actually intended to provide specifically
for modern public law litigation. Nonetheless, the Committee's purposes were consistent with, and probably even fostered, the institution
and vigorous pursuit of this litigation. 36
·
From 1938 until the early 1960s, courts and commentators found
that the Rules functioned rather well, and the federal judiciary experienced comparatively little difficulty applying them. 37 There were relatively few amendments, and many of these were characterized as "clarifying" changes. 38 Some revisions made the Rules even more
permissive and flexible. Indeed, the Advisory Committee, in crafting
the liberalized 1966 party joinder amendments, admonished federal
courts to apply flexibly and pragmatically the requirements governing
30. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1988 amendment); cf Burbank, supra note 29, at
1045-98 (assessment of developments leading to passage).
31. See Subrin, supra note 29, at 973; Tobias, supra note 4, at 273.
32. See Resnik, supra note 21, at 508-15; Subrin, supra note 29, at 922, 973-78.
Although the Supreme Court has formal statutory authority for promulgating and amending
the Rules, the Advisory Committee develops proposals for revision which the Court rarely
changes. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1029, 1032 (I 966)(dissenting
statement of Justice Black). I recognize that reality here by referring to the Committee rather
than to the Committee, the Court and Congress.
33. See Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986); Subrin, The New Era in American Civil
Procedure, 61 A.B.A. J. 1648-50 (1981).
34. See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-I. The Background, 44 YALE
L.J. 387, 415-35 (1935 (contemporaneous advocacy of merger).
35. See Subrin, supra note 29, at 922, 925-26.
36. For analysis of relevant materials that reaches the conclusions in the text, see
Tobias, supra note 4, at 276-77.
37. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 21, at 515-17; 4 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1008 (1987).
38. See Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28
STAN. L. REV. 397, 397 n.2 (1976) (few amendments); Clark, Clarifying Amendments to the
Federal Rules, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 241 (1953) (clarifying amendments).
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compulsory party joinder (Rule 19), class actions (Rule 23), and intervention of right (Rule 24(a)(2)). 39 Many members of the federal
bench followed this admonition between 1965 and 1975. Some federal
judges created a "public rights exception" to compulsory party joinder,
and a number of courts granted intervention of right quite liberally;
while numerous other judges evidenced greater willingness to certify
class actions, so that they experienced much more widespread, albeit
controversial, application. 40 Judges generously interpreted additional
rules, especially those pertaining to pleading and discovery. 41 Moreover, the "liberal ethos," which pervaded the Rules as a set oflitigation
principles, and the flexibility that equity promoted, permitted public
interest litigants to initiate lawsuits, defeat preliminary motions, undertake thorough discovery, and reach the merits as plaintiffs, and to
gain intervention rather easily as applicants. 42
In short, the Federal Rules as written and as enforced, together
with the other developments explored, offered a conducive environment in which public law litigation could grow and mature. Crucial to
what happened was the gradual, sustained liberalization of citizen access across a broad spectrum of doctrinal areas, including public participation in agency proceedings, standing to commence litigation, and
the right to intervene in lawsuits. 43 Against this backdrop, the specific
concepts of standing and intervention of right will be analyzed more
closely.
B. Standing
Throughout much of the country's history, there was no discrete
body of standing law, 44 and the question of standing turned on whether
39. See Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 19, 39 F.R.D. 89 (1966); Rule 23, id.
at 98; and Rule 24(a)(2), id. at 109; cf Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review),
84 MtcH. L. REv. 1463, 1479 (1987) ("the 1966 amendments made the triumph [of equity}
complete").
40. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 757-59 (public rights exception); Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the "Class Action Problem", 92
HARV. L. REv. 664 ( 1979) (class actions).
41. See Miller, supra note 21, at 8-9, 14-15; Tobias, supra note 4, at 285-87.
42. See Miller, supra note 21, at 14-15; Subrin, supra note 29, at 968.
43. See Resnik, supra note 21, at 516; Tobias, Toward An Independent Public Law,
4 ADM IN. L.J. 143 ( 1990). See generally supra note 4.
44. Standing warrants comparatively less treatment here because others have competently chronicled relevant developments and because intervention of right is the predominant concern of this Article. I principally treat standing to seek judicial review of agency
action, supplementing that with analysis of additional areas when they are pertinent to the
Article's central concerns. In discussing standing, I thus rely substantially on Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988). For recent valuable
examination of standing, see Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988);
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371 ( 1988). Cf Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 68 n. 3 ( 1984) (catalog
of earlier scholarship). See also J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978).

424

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

positive law recognized a cause of action. 45 The requirement that plaintiffs possess something in the nature of a common law right to sue
meant that regulated interests, such as public utilities, were able to
challenge governmental activity in court but that competitors and regulatory beneficiaries, such as purchasers of consumer goods, could
not. 46 This private law construct of standing reflected the convergence
of two distinct groups of concepts: first, that federal courts were to
prevent governmental intrusions into common law interests and second, thatjusticiability doctrines, namely standing, should be employed
to minimize the judiciary's intervention in governmental decisionmaking. 47
Over time, the federal courts repudiated this private law approach
to standing in two fundamental ways. One was to find that statutorilyprotected interests were cognizable. 48 The other was the development
of the notion of "surrogate standing," whereby Congress permitted
specific individuals or groups that lacked interests protected by legislation to vindicate the interests of the public,. essentially serving as
private attorneys general. 49 Congress codified these premises for standing in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), adopted in 1946: "A
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 Congress intended "legal wrong" to encompass injury to constitutional, common law, and
statutory interests, and "adversely affected or aggrieved" to permit surrogate standing, provided that the substantive measure so prescribed. 51
Neither the APA's language nor its legislative history clearly stated if,
and when, regulatory beneficiaries would have standing. 52 Nonetheless,
in the mid-l 960s, numerous circuit courts read the statutorily protected
interest component of the legal wrong idea in ways that permitted the
beneficiaries to challenge the legality of agency decisionmaking. 53

°

45. See J. VINING, supra note 44, at 55; Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1044; Winter, supra
note 44, at 1395-96.
46. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1723 (1975); Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1436.
47. See Stewart, supra note 46, at 1724 (first group); Sunstein, supra note 44, at
1438 (both groups).
·
48. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); The Chicago Junction
Case, 264 U.S. 258, 262-69 ( 1924); see also Stewart, supra note 46, at 1725-30.
49. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940); see
also Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1439.
50. 5
§ 702 (1988).
51. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1440-41.
52. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 276 (1946);ATT'Y GEN. COMM.
ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., !st Sess. 84 (1941).
53. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359

u.s.c.
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The federal judiciary could have employed these concepts to
elaborate the legal wrong test in a manner that would have provided
statutory beneficiaries expansive standing. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court adopted a different approach to standing in the 1970 landmark
case of Association ofData Processing Service Organizations v. Camp. 54
The Court required that plaintiffs suffer an injury in fact which was
arguably within the zone of interests protected by the applicable constitutional or statutory command. 55 The Court thus substituted for the
legal interest test a factual inquiry into whether injury existed.
For a number of years, the Data Processing articulation appeared
to work reasonably well, facilitating the development of a standing
doctrine of considerable coherence. The "arguably within the zone"
requirement functioned pragmatically as a feasible, liberal threshold
test. 56 In time, however, sharp criticism of Data Processing arose. 57
The injury-in-fact test alone eventually became inadequate to the task
of determining who, of the substantial number of people and interests
affected by agency decisions in an integrated economy, should have
standing. 58
In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court employed several concepts
to restrict open-ended access to the courts. 59 Ultimately the Court
developed requirements to supplement the injury-in-fact test. Plaintiffs
now must show that they have suffered some actual .or threatened
harm, which is "distinct and palpable," not abstract, conjectural or
hypothetical. 60 Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged unlawful behavior of the defendant. 61 Finally, there must be a
substantial likelihood that plaintiWs injury will be redressed by a
favorable determination. 62 The Court presently characterizes these
F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608,
615-17 (2d Cir. 1965).
54. 397 U.S. 150 ( 1970).
55. Id. at 153.
56. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 4 79 U.S. 388, 395-400 ( 1987); see also
Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1450.
57. See, e.g., Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 41, 43-44;
Stewart, Standing for Solidarity (Book Review), 88 YALE L.J. 1559, 1569 ( 1979).
58. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 395-97; see also J. VINING, supra note 44, at 32.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). The concepts were
not especially applicable to administrative law and plausible arguments underlie most of
them. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1451.
60. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983); Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 100 (1979); accord Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S.
Ct. 1717, 1723 (1990); Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1989); Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
61. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976);
accord Primate Protection League v. Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S. Ct. 1700, 1704 ( 1991 ); Allen,
468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
62. See, e.g., Simon, 426 U.S. at 41; accord County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
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restrictions as constitutional in nature. 63
The Supreme Court also has imposed a set of prudential limitations, essentially to protect the judiciary's prerogatives and resources,
and plaintiffs must meet the restrictions, even when they have satisfied
the constitutional requirements. 64 Plaintiffs generally must assert their
own legal interests and rights, rather than those of third parties. 65 Plaintiffs cannot vindicate " 'abstract questions of wide public significance'
[amounting to] 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most
appropriately addressed in the representative branches." 66 The Court
essentially considers· the zone of interest test a prudential requirement. 67
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have more readily
found that plaintiffs possess standing in the major category of cases
that challenge agency decisionmaking under Section 702 of the APA. 68
For instance, the Court recently observed that the zone of interest
requirement is "not meant to be especially demanding" and characterized it as a guide for determining whether, in light of "Congress'
evident intent to make agency action presumptively reviewable," a
specific plaintiff should be heard to challenge a particular administrative judgment. 69 Indeed, until this Term, the Court had never rejected
standing because a plaintiff failed to satisfy the zone test. 70
The Supreme Court has articulated numerous justifications for
standing, although the opinions do not always clearly state how standing's requirements effectuate its ostensible purposes. 71 The Court has
observed that Article III standing law is "built on a single basic ideathe idea of separation of powers." 72 Correspondingly, the Court has
111 S. 0. 1661, 1667 (1991); Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1723; Asarco, 490 U.S. at 614-16;
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
63. See, e.g., Gollust v. Mendell, 111 S. a. 2173, 2180 (1991); Allen, 468 U.S. at
751; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472-74.
64. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75.
65. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. a. 2077, 2087 (1991);
United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990); Secretary of State v. Joseph
H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-58 (1984).
.
66. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500
(1975)); accord Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
67. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16 (1987).
68. This category is in comparison to cases that invoke constitutional provisions
or implicate taxpayer or citizen standing. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
69. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399. The Supreme Court's technical treatment in two very
recent cases may retreat somewhat from Clarke. See Air Courier Conf. v. American Postal
Workers Union, 111 S. 0. 913 (1991); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. 0. 3177
(1990).
70. See Air Courier Conj., 111 S. <:;t. at 915; See also Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186-87;
Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1445 n.56. Of course, the lower courts have followed the Supreme
Court's articulation of standing. Recent examples are North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d
1239 (7th Cir. 1991); Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
71. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1438 (standing restrictions justified on basis
of policies having minimal or no relationship to standing).
72. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
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recognized that the exercise of judicial power affects relationships
among the co-equal branches of the federal government, most profoundly when the judiciary declares activity of the political branches
unconstitutional. 73 The Court also has remarked that standing helps
to insure that legal issues presented to federal courts will be resolved
"in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of
the consequences of judicial action." 74 Moreover, the Court has intimated that standing reflects respect for the autonomy of people who
are likely to be affected most directly by a judicial determination. 75
Another justification for standing is that it guarantees efficacious or
sincere advocacy. 76 Standing restrictions are said as well to be mechanisms for reducing the civil caseload. 77
Some judges and many commentators have criticized the Supreme
Court's standing jurisprudence. 78 The Court's enunciation of standing
requirements has been unclear and inconsistent, aspects the Court itself
has been compelled to admit. 79 The Supreme Court has granted standing in cases when it should have been denied and rejected standing in
situations when it should have been found, results which often appear
to reflect a majority's views on the merits. 80 Moreover, the Court has
supported certain standing limitations with policies only minimally
related to standing. 81 Furthermore, the Court, in articulating the standing.requirements, has evinced little concern that they be consistent with
closely related justiciability concepts, such as mootness, or with additional relevant court access doctrines and ideas pertaining to a case's
structure, like pendent jurisdiction and intervention of right. 82

73. See, e.g.. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1982).
74. Id. at 472; accord Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947,
955 ( 1984); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 ( 1972).
75. See Brilmayer, Judical Review, Justiciability and the Limits ofthe Common Law
Method, 57 B.U.L. REv. 807, 823-24 ( 1977); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article Ill:
Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 312-15 (1979).
76. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472-73.
77. See, e.g., Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Public Law Lit·
igation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18-26 (1982); Sunstein, supra note 44, at
1448 n. 74.
78. See. e.g., sources cited in Nichol, supra note 44, at 68 n.3.
79. "We need not mince words when we say that the concept of'Art. III Standing'
has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this
Court .... " Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475; accord Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 ( 1984).
80. See Chayes, supra note 77, at 14-22; Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1448.
81. For instance, although standing limitations are said to insure efficacious or
sincere advocacy, public interest litigants, like the Sierra Club, that have not suffered injury
in fact, are especially likely to be effective advocates. See Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1044; Meltzer,
Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants
as Private Attorneys General, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 247, 295-313 ( 1988). See generally supra
note 76 and accompanying text.
82. See Bandes, supra note 1I, at 227-29, 235-55.
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Standing, therefore, has traditionally been viewed as what the federal judiciary demands of those who wish to commence litigation. The
Supreme Court has observed: "In essence the question of standing is
whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of
the dispute or of particular issues. " 83 Intervention of right, by comparison, is what judges require ofan applicant that wishes to participate
in litigation, in which the plaintiff has standing, before the court enters
an order tha.t may prejudice the applicant.

C. Intervention of Right
The history of intervention of right prior to the amendment of
Rule 24(a)(2) in 1966 needs only brief examination here. 84 In a pathbreaking article published during 1936, Professors Moore and Levi
identified two classifications of cases in which judges seemed to assume
that applicants were entitled to intervene, and these categories underlie
original Rule 24 promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1938. 85
Paragraph (a)(3) of the Rule mandated intervention when applicants would be affected adversely by the disposition of property within
a court's control. 86 The Advisory Committee intended that the paragraph codify existing intervention practice, whereby courts had broadly
interpreted the idea of property so as to grant intervention liberally. 87
Thus, some judges treating intervention petitions filed after the Rule's
adoption "virtually disregarded the language of this provision. " 88
Paragraph (a)(2) provided for intervention of right by an applicant
that might be bound, and whose interests could be represented inad83. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); accord Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490
.
U.S. 605, 612-13 (1989).
84. I rely most in this subsection on Shreve, Questioning Intervention of RightToward a New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 894 (1980). See also F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, C1v1L PROCEDURE 548-53 (3d ed. 1985); Moore & Levi, Federal
Intervention I. The Right to Intervene and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565, 577-81 (1936).
85. The first involved cases in which the absentee asserted an interest in property
the court controlled whose distribution would prejudice the absentee. The second included
cases in which possible resolution of the original litigants' dispute would bind an absentee's
later effort to protect its interest which the parties inadequately represented. See Moore &
Levi, supra note 84, at 581, 582-95; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 24, I F.R.D. xciv-xcv (1938).
86. "Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action
when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court ... ."See FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a)(3), I F.R.D.
xciv ( 1938).
87. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, NOTES 25 (Mar. 1938); see also Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 508 (1941).
88. FED. R. C1v. P. 24 advisory committee's note; see also Cohn, The New Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1231 (1966); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L.
REV. 356, 400-02 (1967).
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equately, ifthe litigation proceeded in its absence. 89 Although numerous courts read the "bound" language to mean practical prejudice, 90 a
majority of judges interpreted it in a resjudicata sense. 91 The Supreme
Court, in the 1961 case of Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 92
subscribed to the res judicata reading, found that application inconsistent with the inadequate representation requirement, and rendered
paragraph (a)(2) a nullity in class actions. 93
This interpretation was the major reason for the amendment of
Rule 24 in 1966, and it was included in a package of party joinder
amendments that substantially revised Rules 19, 23 and 24. 94 The Advisory Committee intended that the changes promote more flexible,
practical judicial application generally and rectify specific difficulties
federal courts had encountered when interpreting the Rules' terminology. The drafters also purportedly meant to include criteria for party
joinder decisionmaking, not definitional classifications, although they
apparently failed to execute this intent in writing Rule 24(a)(2). 95
The 1966 amendment of Rule 24 collapsed the .requirements of
paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) into one provision. Revised paragraph
{a)(2) states that potential intervenors with an interest in the property
or transaction that is the subject of the litigation which may suffer
practical prejudice shall be permitted to intervene, unless existing parties represent them adequately. 96 Precisely what the Advisory Committee intended to achieve with the changes in Rule 24(a)(2) remains
unclear and controversial. Nonetheless, it is possible to afford an account of those considerations most relevant to the issues discussed here.
89. See FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a)(2), I F.R.D. xciv (1938).
90. See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387, 394 (D.C. Cir.
1962); Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. (1960), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 830 (1960); see also Shreve, supra note 84, at 904.
91. See, e.g., Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19, 21 (1951); see also
Shreve, supra note 84, at 904. See generally Colin, supra note 88, at 1229 (many courts
ignored question of adequate representation).
92. 36.6 U.S. 683 (1961).
93. Id.
691-93.
This holding created a Catch-22 situation with respect to intervention by a class
member in a pen4ing class action on grounds of inadequate representation: if the
class member was in fact inadequately represented, the judgment would not bind
him ... on the other hand, if representation was adequate, there was no ground for
his intervention.
United States v. Hooker Chems: & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 982 n. 13 (2d Cir. 1984)
(citation omitted).
94. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 15354 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Cohn, supra note 88, at 1204, 1230; see also supra note
39 and accompanying text.
·
95. See Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 KY. L.J.
329, 374 (1969); see also Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies,
and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 757-62 (1968).
96. See supra note I.
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The Committee certainly meant to remedy problems-especially
rendering paragraph (a)(2) a nullity in class actions-that the Supreme
Court's interpretation in Sam Fox had created. 97 The drafters also
sought to foster more flexible, pragmatic judicial treatment of intervention of right and its three principal specific requirements-interest,
impairment and inadequate representation. 98
Less clear is exactly what the Advisory Committee intended with
respect to the interest criterion. Some judges, including members of
the Supreme Court, have maintained that the Committee meant to
leave the interest idea unchanged. 99 Nevertheless, the drafters seemed
to contemplate some modification, albeit limited. In 1967, Professor
Benjamin Kaplan, who had served as the Reporter for the Advisory
Committee at the time of the Rule's amendment, wrote that the altered
phraseology was supposed to "drive beyond the narrow notion of an
interest in specific property [although] interest ... in the new rule finds
its own limits in the historic continuity of the subject of intervention
and in the concepts of new Rule 19, to which intervention looks for
analogy." 100 Moreover, the drafters deleted the requirement that applicants have an interest in property in the court's custody, perhaps
evincing cognizance that less tangible interests might suffice; 101 however, the 1966 version states that applicants must have an interest
"relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action."102
Another area of ambiguity involves the question of whether the
Committee· intended to provide specifically for public law litigation
when reformulating the provision. Some courts and writers have contended that the drafters revised all three party joinder amendments or
at least Rule 24 with public law cases in mi~d. 103 Professor Kaplan
97. See Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 24, 39 F.R.D. 89, 109 ( 1966); see also
Kaplan, supra note 88, at 401-02.
98. See Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 24, 39 F.R.D. 89, 109 .(1966); see also
Hooker Chems., 749 F.2d at 982 n. 13.
··'·
99. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 71, 75 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984);
100. Kaplan, supra note 88, at 405.
IOI. Professor Bandes states that the 1966 amendment abandoned the property restrictions "in keeping with the trend toward recognizing less tangible interests." Bandes, supra
note 11, at 252 n. 164 (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-89 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)). The
Court decided those cases, however, a decade after the Advisory Committee had "essentially
finished writing the party joinder amendments." See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
102. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 710 F.2d 1040, 1047 (5th Cir. 1983); Chayes,
supra note 13, at 1292.
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alluded, although obliquely, to this possibility in 1968, by observing
that the amendment of Rule 23 was meant to foster more vigorous
invocation of the class action device as a mechanism for vindicating
the interests of large numbers of people who individually would be
unable to litigate. 104
Certain judges and commentators, however, have asserted that the
Advisory Committee drafted the three party joinderamendments principally for private law suits. 105 Professor Arthur Miller, another former
Reporter, has argued persuasively that the importance of Rule 23's
revision to public law litigation and to the "litigation explosion" has
been overstated. 106 He also has observed that the Committee had essentially finished writing the party joinder amendments in 1962-prior
to the substantial expansion of public law litigation, Congressional passage of much "social" legislation, and the relatively widespread recognition of new ways of conceptualizing the "interest" idea, such as
liberalization of standing discussed above. 107 In short, the drafters probably did not specifically anticipate or expressly provide in Rule 24(a)(2)
for public law litigation in a number of the forms it presently assumes.108
Courts and writers have criticized the amendment of Rule 24(a)(2)
and its quartercentury of judicial application. Shortly after the Committee revised the provision in 1966, two respected scholars claimed
that Rule 24(a)(2) was flawed in the amendment process. 109 Professor
John Kennedy observed that the drafters had not followed through on
their commitment to provide decisional criteria, rather than definitional categories, in the party joinder amendments, leaving the revision
incomplete. 110 Professor David Shapiro, essentially concurring in that
assessment, suggested numerous relevant criteria to fill this gap and
recommended that the Advisory Committee combine intervention of
right and permissive intervention under Rule 24 (b). 111 Professor
104. See Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, IO B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1968).
In 1989, he observed that "there was a sense in which the. amended rule was not neutral: it
did not escape attention at the time that it would open the way to the assertion of many,
many claims that otherwise would not be pressed; so the rule would stick in the throats of
establishment defendants." Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 212627 (1989).
105. See, e.g., Hooker Chems., 749 F.2d at 983-84; Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694,
700 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Note, Intervention in Government Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1174
(1976).
106. See Miller, supra note 40, at 664-76.
107. See id. at 670 n. 31. See generally supra notes 4-5, 9-20, 102 and accompanying
text. But see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
I 08. This is particularly true of institutional reform litigation. See supra notes 15-16
and accompanying text. See generally supra note 36 and accompanying text.
I 09. See Kennedy, supra note 95; Shapiro, supra note 95.
110. See Kennedy, supra note 95, at 374-75.
111. See Shapiro, supra note 95, at 757-64.
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Emma Coleman Jordan and Professor Gene Shreve subsequently identified inconsistencies in the judicial application of intervention and
waste of judicial resources in intervention decisionmaking, especially
concerning appeals. 112 The commentators made suggestions similar to
those of Professors Kennedy and Shapiro, such as recommending that
all non-statutory intervention of right decisionmaking be committed
to trial court discretion. 113 The next part analyzes judicial application
of Rule 24(a)(2) over the last twenty-five years.

lII.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF RULE 24(A)(2)

Fe4eral judges have encountered many problems delineating precisely what applicants must show to intervene of right. The complications entailed in treating the interest requirement, however, are paradigmatic and most important to standing's relevance to the question
of intervention of right. 114 The interest requirement, th.erefore, will be
the focus of this part, while the remaining three requirements-impairment, inadequate representations and timeliness-will be examined.
when relevant.
Numerous courts and commentators have recognized that the federal judiciary has experienced considerable difficulty in defining the
interest necessary to satisfy Rule 24(a)(2) since the time of its 1966
amendment. 115 Some have observed that an authoritative definition
has yet to be enunciated, 116 while others have considered futile attempts
to elaborate the interest idea. 117
The Supreme Court has rarely a<,idressed Rule 24(a)(2}, and when
it has, the opinions have been.peculiarly fact-bound, affording minimal
guidance, especially as to the meaning of interest. 118 In the 1967 case
112. See Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need for Intervention to Af
firm Affirmative Action, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 47, 55-62, 69-70 (1979) (inconsistent
judicial application); Shreve, supra note 84, at 921-24 (waste of judicial resources)..
113. See Jones, supra note 112, at 62-78, 83-86 (suggesting flexible application solicitous of civil rights litigants); Shreve, supra note 84, at 924-27 (suggesting commitment to
trial court discretion).
114. Interest is part of the impairment and inadequate representation requirements
and implicates timeliness, while judicial application of interest is typical of the other three
criteria. Moreover, judicial invocation of standing implicates the interest condition much
more than the remaining requirements.
115. See, e.g., Independent Petrochemical v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 105 F.R.D.
106, 109-10 (D.D.C. 1985); 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1908, at 263-88 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE].
116. See, e.g., Panola Land Buying Co. v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1523 (I Ith Cir. 1988)
(Clark, J., dissenting); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
117. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf Washington State
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (example ofNinth Circuit opinions that apparently ignore interest
requirement).
118. See Panola, 844 F.2d at 1523; Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th
Cir. 1987); FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1908, at 265-66, 270.

1991:415

Standing to Intervene

433

of Cascade Natural Gas. Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 119 the Court
read the Rule broadly and granted intervention of right, implying that
a particular equitable or legal interest is unnecessary to satisfy the
Rule. 120 Judges and writers have ascribed the Court's determination to
its "splenetic displeasure" with the federal govern~ent's handling of
the natural gas antitrust case and to the Court's desire to facilitate the
vindication of substantive rights considered to have national consequence by potential intervenors which included the State of California
and companies that were dependent on competition. 121
The Court interpreted Rule 24(a){2) narrowly by requiring that an
applicant have a "significantly protectable" interest in the 1971 opinion,
Donaldson v. United States. 122 Courts and comm~ntators have obs{'.rved, however, that the quoted language has "not been a term of art
iri the law of intervention and provides "little more guidance than does
the bare term 'interest'" in the Rule while stating that. ~here is considerable disagreement about its meaning. 123 Some writers also have criticized the Court's interpretation of the Rule, principc;tllY because it was
allegedly manipulating procedure to protect the government's substantive interest in effective enforcement of the tax statutcs. 124
In the 1972 decision Trbovich v. United States, 125 the Supreme
Court found that the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
did not proscnbe union members' intervention in litigation that the
Secretary of Labor commenced in an effort to set aside the election of
officers of th~ union. 126 The Court seemed to imply that intervention
applicants need not have standing and explicitly recognized the "distinction between intervention and initiation," 127 but the Court limited
the intervention granted and the opinion probably s6ould be restricted
to its facts and the peculiar statutory scheme invol~ed. 128
119. 386 U.S. 129, 132-36 (1967).
120. Independent Petrochemical, 105 F.R.D. at 110 n. 8 (Court implicitly rejected
specific interest); accord Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bakker, 132 F.R.D. 155, 157
(W.D.N.C. 1990).
121. See Smuck, 408 F;2d at 179 n. 16; accord Hooker Chems., 749 F.2d at 986 n.
15. Cf. Shreve, supra note 84, at 923 n. 124 (Court's desire to facilitate intervenor's vindication
of rights); FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1908, at 264-68 (helpful analysis of case).
122. 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971).
123. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1908, at 270; accord Purnell v. City of
Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 947 (6th Cir. 1991); Panola, 844 F.2d at 1521.
124. See, e.g., Shreve, supra note 84, at 924 n. 125; FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
115, § 1908, at 270. The Court held that a taxpayer could not intervene of right in a summary
proceeding by the Internal Revenue Service to enforce a third party's compliance with the
Service's subpoena seeking records that implicated the taxpayer's tax liabilities. See Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 528-30.
125. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
126. The Court so held, even· though the statute expressly barred union members
from initiating suit. Id. at 531.
127. See id. at 536.
128. See id. at 536-37. The Court restricted intervention to the claims of illegality
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The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that some lower federal courts were invoking standing in their intervention of right decisionmaking and that others were not in the 1986 determination in
Diamond v. Char/es. 129 A majority of the Court specifically refrained
from deciding whether potential intervenors "must satisfy not only the
requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Article Ill,"
while holding that "an intervenor's right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements
of Art. 111." 130 Three concurring justices observed, however, that the
1966 amendment did not change the provision's interest criterion,
claiming that Rule 24(a)(2)'s " 'requirement of a significantly protectable interest' calls for a direct and concrete interest that is accorded
some degree of legal protection." 131
This relative dearth of Supreme Court precedent and its fact-intensive nature have meant that the lower federal courts have assumed
primary responsibility for articulating the interest requirement and for
applying Rule 24(a)(2). Circuit and district judges have exhibited great
difficulty defining interest with sufficient clarity, despite the thousands
of opportunities available to them. Indeed, Professor Susan Bandes
recently identified some half-dozen formulations of the interest requirement, several of which are defined inconsistently, a finding my
research essentially confirms. 132
Judicial articulation of the interest requirement ranges across a
broad spectrum. At one end, there is a cluster of ideas that may fairly
included in the Secretary's complaint. Id. at 537. Courts rely on Trbovich today mostly for
its articulation of the adequate representation requirement: the condition "is satisfied if the
applicant shows that representation of his interest 'may be' inadequate; and the burden of
making that showing should be treated as minimal." Id. at 538 n.10 (citation omitted).
129. 476 U.S. 54, 68 n.21 (1986). For a description of the facts in Diamond and an
explanation of how a district court should have resolved Dr. Diamond's request to intervene
of right, see infra notes 211-24 and accompanying' text.
130. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68. For recent lower court opinions following Diamond,
see United States v. Western Electric Co., 900 F.2d 283, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Eubanks v.
Wilkinson, 891 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1989). See generally infra note 167 and accompanying
text.
131. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court has addressed Rule 24(aX2) in additional opinions. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 367-68 (1980),
may be read as an implicit rejection of the requirement that applicants must have standing.
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987), principally treats the
appealability of district court intervention decisionmaking. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
( 1989), requires that plaintiffs join under Rule 19 absentees who might be adversely affected
by entry of a consent decree in Title VII litigation, rather than demanding that the absentees
seek to intervene under Rule 24.
132. See Bandes, supra note 11, at 251. My research includes earlier analyses of
broader application of Rule 24(a)(2) in ways that disadvantaged public interest litigants and
of intervention in abortion litigation. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 322-29; Tobias, Intervention
After Webster, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 731 (1990). It also includes analysis of all opinions
mentioning standing-research undertaken for this piece. My conclusion is that Professor
Bandes may have underestimated the number of formulations and the degree of inconsistency.
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be characterized as flexible or even open-textured; the principal proponents of these views have been judges in the United States Courts
of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits. 133 A few
of these judges effectively read the interest idea out of Rule 24(a)(2) or
even ignore it. 134 Most of the courts, however, expend little energy
attempting to extract meaning from the term interest. Rather, they
examine the pragmatic implications of denying intervention and the
policies underlying the 1966 amendment, occasionally stating that the
Advisory Committee meant to liberalize intervention of right. 135 Insofar as the courts rely on any definition of interest, they subscribe to
Judge Harold Leventhal's 1967 enunciation: "the 'interest' test is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many
apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due
process." 136 A number of these judges concomitantly consider interest
a threshold requirement, finding Rule 24(a)(2)'s impairment and inadequate representation criteria preferable mechanisms for resolving
intervention controversies. 137 Moreover, many of the courts expressly
reject the notions that interest means a specific equitable or legal
interest 138 or connotes a "direct, substantial, legally protectable interest
in the proceedings." 13 9
These formulations-especially ones cast. in terms substantially
similar to the latter articulation in the sentence above-are employed
by many judges, principally in the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits,
whose treatment of the interest requirement lies at the more restrictive
end of the spectrum. 140 Numerous courts apply tests that are equally,
133. See, e.g., Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700; Independent Petrochemical, 105 F.R.D. at
109-10; see also Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 824-25 (5th Cir.
. 1967).
134. See, e.g., Spellman, 684 F.2d at 629-30; Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886, 887
(9th Cir. 1980).
135. See, e.g., Smuck, 408 F.2d at 177-78; cf Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians
v. United States, 921 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635,
637 (9th Cir. 1988).
.
136. Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700; accord Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d
302, 308 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 729 (4th Cir. 1986); Sanguine,
Ltd. v. United States Dep't oflnterior, 798 F.2d 389, 392 (10th Cir. 1986);Atlantis, 379 F.2d
m~~

,

137. See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980); Smuck,
408 F.2d at 179; United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 418-20 (D. Minn.
1972).
138. See, e.g., Cascade Nat. Gas Corp., 386 U.S. at 132-36; Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700;
Smuck, 408 F.2d at 178-80; Independent Petrochemical, 105 F.R.D. at 110 n. 8; Employers
Reinsurance Corp. v. Bakker, 132 F.R.D. 155, 157 (W.D.N.C. 1990).
139. See, e.g., Independent Petrochemical, 105 F.R.D. at 109~10. For cases that subscribe to the articulation, see Manasota-88, Inc. v. Tidwell, 896 F.2d 1318, 1322 (I Ith Cir.
1990); American Nat'! Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 145, 146 (7th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 754 F.Supp. 935, 939 (D. Mass. 1991).
140. Professor Bandes nicely captures the permutations and combinations with citations to relevant cases. See Bandes, supra note 11, at 251.
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if not more, stringent, demanding that applicants be real parties in
interest or be able to state a claim for relief. 141
In short, the lower federal courts have had primary responsibility
for applying the interest condition since the 1966 revision .of Rule
24(a)(2). One salient feature of the several thousand intervention opinions that these judges issued between 1966 and 1980 was that almost
none required applicants to have standing. 142 Nevertheless, since 1980
an increasing number of judges has demanded that potential intervenors possess something greater than, or equal to, standing or satisfy
certain constituents of the standing inquiry. The Supreme Court recently acknowledged that lower federal courts were invoking standing
in their intervention determinations but refused to address the propriety of that practice. 143 Since 1986, numerous judges have relied on
standing to resolve intervention requests, some have rejected its applicability, and the vast majority has not mentioned standing in ruling
on intervention motions. The invocation of standing has created conflicts within the federal judiciary while imposing uncertainty and hardship on litigants and applicants. These difficulties will worsen, until the
Supreme Court resolves the relevance of standing to intervention of
right. The next section considers the cases which have said or indicated
that standing implicates the Rule 24(a)(2) inquiry.
IV. APPLICATION OF STANDING TO INTERVENTION OF RIGHT

A. Standing as Relevant to Intervention of Right
Many circuit and district court judges with differing degrees of
explicitness have stated how standing implicates the intervention of
right inquiry. Moreover, a significant number has subscribed to different combinations of the formulations, adopting, for example, certain
constituents of the constitutional requirements or various aspects of
the prudential limitations.
141. See, e.g., Worlds v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitation Servs., 929 F.2d 591,
594 (I Ith Cir. 1991) (real party in interest); New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe
Line, 732 F.2d 452, 463-65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984) (state claim for
relief); cf Manasota, 896 F.2d at 1321 (substantial, legally protectable interest and real party
.
in interest).
142. A few courts mentioned standing, but virtually none required that applicants
possess standing. See, e.g., Du Pree v. United States, 559 F.2d 11 SI, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 1977);
lllinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 1977); Providence Journal v. F.B.l., 460 F.
Supp. 762, 766 (D.R.I. 1978); Arvida Corp. v. City of Boca Raton, 59 F.R.D. 316, 321 (S.D.
Fla. 1973); United States v. Int'! Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22, 26-27 (D. Conn. 1972).
Of course, some of these cases involved private law litigation in which standing has considerably less relevance.
143. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986).
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Several courts have expressly demanded that intervention applicants possess something more substantial than standing. One of the
most specific articulations appears in the 1985 Seventh Circuit opinion,
United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land. 144 In that case, Congress had
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to condemn a power company's
real property for inclusion in a National Lakeshore. 145 The Seventh
Circuit upheld the trial judge's rejection of an intervehtion request filed
by a public interest litigant whose members had lobbied Congress to
create the Lakeshore, had used it for recreation, and had sought to
challenge the Department's tepid commitment to condemnation. 146
The circuit court stated that the interest of an inte~ention applicant
"must be greater than the interest sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement." 147 The panel found a "qualitative difference between ...
the 'direct, significant legally protectable interest' required to intervene
in a condemnation action [and] the 'interest' which is sufficient for
standing to bring an action under the APA," because the latter interest
only must be one that is arguably within the zone of interest protected
by applicable legislation. 148
Numerous courts have demanded that applicants possess an interest equivalent to standing. One prominent example is the 1984 opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit in Southern Christian Lead·ership Conference v. Kelley. 149 Kelley involved Senator Jesse Helms'
attempt to intervene of right in litigation over electronic surveillance
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
The Senator reportedly sought to participate so that he could cast an
informed vote on the proposal to establish a national holiday honoring
Dr. King. 150 The court affirmed the district judge's denial of the intervention motion, "because the movant lack[ed] a protectable interest
sufficient to confer standing." 151 The Kelley court observed that Rule
24(a)(2) implicitly refers to a legally protectable interest, remarking that
"such a gloss upon the rule is in any case required by Article III of the
Constitution." 152 Judges in, or on, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have
adopted similar formulations, stating, for example, that the "would-be
144. 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986).
145. See 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d at 859; see also Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460u to 460u-23 ( 1982).
146. See 36.96Acres, 754 F.2d at 858-60.
147. Id. at 859; accord Lac Courte Oreilles Band oflndians v. Wisconsin, 116 F.R.D.
608, 610-11 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
148. See 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d at 859. The panel's allusions to standing are premised
on Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 ( 1972), which the applicants .claimed should support
their intervention.
149. 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 778.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 779.
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intervenor must demonstrate at least the interest required to assert
standing to initiate a lawsuit" 153 or must possess an interest identical
to that of parties. 154
Many courts have invoked particular standing requirements articulated by the Supreme Court. Some judges, for instance, apparently
adverting to prudential limitations on standing, have demanded that
applicants assert their own rights, not those of third parties, that potential intervenors have a "particularized interest rather than a generalized grievance," or that their claims be closely related to the interests
that relevant legislation is intended to protect. 155 A few courts, seemingly drawing on the constitutional component of standing doctrine,
have insisted that applicants' injuries be fairly traceable to defendants'
allegedly unlawful conduct or that there be a substantial likelihood that
a favorable judgment will redress the harm. 156
Additional courts when resolving intervention requests or considering the Rule's four specific requirements, especially the interest criterion, have mentioned standing, have imposed on applicants requirements which are functional equivalents of standing, or have otherwise
indicated that standing somehow implicates Rule 24(a)(2). 157 A number
of these judicial determinations are unclear, with numerous courts
seemingly employing standing in a "loose" or colloquial sense of being
heard to made an assertion, including the idea of a right to, an interest
in, or an entitlement to, a claim. 158
153. See Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 9-56, 962 n. l (I Ith Cir. 1986) (Clark, J.,
dissenting); see also Gautreaux v. Kemp, 132 F.R.D. 193, J95 (N.D. IJJ. 1990).
154. See Panola Land Buying Ass'n v, Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988);
see also Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 ( 1985);
New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 732 F.2d 452, 464-65 (5th Cir. 1984);
Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F.R.D. 410, 413 (D. Ariz. 1990).
155. Examples of cases involving third party standing are Panola, 844 F.2d at 1509
and Santiago Collazo v. Franqui Acosta, 721 F. Supp. 385, 388-89 (D.P.R. 1989). Examples
of cases involving a generalized grievance are Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1212
(11th Cir. 1989) and Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 602 (3d Cir. 1987). Examples of cases
involving claims related to statutory·interests are Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866
F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989) and Avery v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 312, 316 (D. Mass. 1984).
156. Examples of courts requiring causation are League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1989) and Avery, 584 F. Supp. at 316. Cf
Santiago Collazo, 721 F. Supp. at 389-90 (redressability).
157. These courts principally are in the Fifth~ Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. Recent
opinions from these circuits which include most of the relevant case law are Clements, 884
F.2d 185; American Nat'! Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1989)
and Manasota-88, Inc. v. Tidwell, 896 F.2d 1318, 1321 (I I th Cir. 1990). See also supra notes
139-41 and accompanying text.
158. Even judges who otherwise champion quite flexible, pragmatic application of
Rule 24(a)(2) speak of"standing to intervene." See, e.g.. 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d at 860, 861
(Cudahy, J., dissenting); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1967). These
judges seem to be using standing in this loose or colloquial sense, as do the authors of most
opinions not already mentioned in this subsection. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct.
1717, 1722 (1990); Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366-68 (1980); United States v. Yonkers
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Nearly all of the judges who make standing relevant to the intervention of right inquiry offer little, if any, explanation for such treatment. Nonetheless, a few courts have been relatively forthcoming. For
instance, one provided that standing case law helps to "define the type
of interest that the intervenor must assert," perhaps evincing appreciation of how standing should be considered relevant to Rule
24(a)(2). 159 That court and others specifically differentiate standing to
initiate litigation from what applicants must show to intervene of right
in ongoing lawsuits, apparently recognizing that these are discrete inquiries.160
Notwithstanding this relative lack of justification for invoking
standing, some plausible, if not compelling, reasons for doing so can
be posited. After all, standing and intervention of right are not completely unrelated ideas: both concepts implicate what courts require of
entities that wish to participate in litigation. Concomitantly, certain
policies that underlie standing are very important to Rule 24(a)(2), as
will be seen below, 161 andjudges may have been so applying standing,
although their opinions do not leave that impression.
Standing also might have seemed to afford a convenient solution
for problems that the 1966 amendment created or left unresolved or
for difficulties that have arisen in the federal courts during the last
quarter century, such as the litigation explosion. For example, judges
Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Napper, 887 F.2d 1528,
1533 (11th Cir. 1989) (Johnson, J., concurring specially); N.Y. State Nat'! Org. for Women
v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1349 (2d Cir. 1989); Howard v. McLucas, 871 F.2d I000, 1004 (11th
Cir. 1989); Eng v. Coughlin, 865 F.2d 521, 527 (2d Cir. 1989) (Mahoney, J., concurring);
Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988); Cook v. Boorstin, 763
F.2d 1462, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hickey v. NCNB
Texas Nat'! Bank, 763 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Tex. 1991). There also is a line of cases, typified
by Panola, that speaks of a lawyer's "standing to intervene" to recover an attorney's fee. For
helpful treatment of this narrow problem, see Note, Fee As the Wind Blows: Waivers of
Attorneys Fees in Individual Civil Rights Actions Since Evans v. Jeff D., 102 HARV. L. REV.
1278, 1282-91 (1989). Other cases not examined or treated tersely above which mention
standing are: Gould v. Alleco, Inc., 883 F.2d 281, 285 (4th Cir., 1989) (generalized interest);
Portland Audubon Soc'y, 866 F.2d at 308 n.I (standing requirement implicitly addressed by
interest requirement); New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 732 F.2d 452, 464
(5th Cir. 1984) (third party standing); Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849, 851
(10th Cir. I 981)(generalized interest); Allard v. Frizzel, 536 F.2d 1332, 1334 (10th Cir. 1976)
(same); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Indians v. Wisconsin, 116 F.R.D. 608, 610 (W.D. Wis.
1987) (generalized interest). The cases treated to this point in the Article are not an exhaustive
compilation but include most of .the major cases.
159. See Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213. Of course, many of the cases treated above apparently apply the standing case law in that way. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., 732 F.2d
at 464-65; Santiago Collazo, 721 F. Supp. at 388-89; cf infra notes 196-97 (how standing
should be considered relevant to Rule 24(a)(2)).
160. See, e.g., Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1212-13; Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 962
n. I (11th Cir. 1986) (Clark, J., dissenting); see also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
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concerned about the increasingly unwieldy party structure of cases may
have found standing an efficacious basis for excluding intervention
applicants that would expand the number of litigants in a lawsuit. 162
Mariy courts apparently have employed standing to deny intervention by applicants that looked like intermeddlers or which asserted
interests that the jµdges might have considered intangible, tenuous or
indirectly related to the litigation's subject matter, particularly as compared with more traditional interests. 163 Numerous courts also seem
to have substituted standing for one of Rule 24(a)(2)'s specific criteria,
namely interest or inadequate representation. 164 Furthermore, most
judges who invoked standing may well have correctly resolved the
intervention of right inquiry, although this is unremarkable. Courts
have a number of means of treating intervention requests, especially
in ways that reject them, such as by demanding that applicants fully
satisfy all four Rule requirements or imposing strict burdens of proof
on them. 165

162. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (cases involving hundreds of parties);
Resnik, supra note 21, at 502 n. 30 ("Calder-like configurations we call 'cases' today"). Standing also might seem to be an effective mechanism for limiting what som!! judges may perceive
as open-ended intervention made possible by the "liberalizing" 1966 amendment. See supra
note 77 and accompanying text.
163. Examples of applicants that courts might have viewed as intermeddlers were
Dr. Diamond in Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), and Senator Helms in Southern
Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984). These, and other,
intervention denials also may have been motivated by political considerations, which some
may consider appropriate, depending.on their political perspectives. For example, excluding
Diamond or the Illinois Right to Life Coalition from Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th
Cir. 1985), would enable pro-choice plaintiffs to pursue their claims to reproductive rights
free from the substantial costs that some intervenors have imposed in abortion litigation.
See Tobias, supra note 132. Of course, this does not exactly yield "neutral principles" of
application. Correspondingly, some courts have excluded industry applicants from litigation
brought by public interest litigants. See, e.g., Manasota-88, 896 F.2d 1318; Portland Audubon
Soc'y, 866 F.2d 302. See also United States v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 922 F.2d
704 (I Ith Cir. 1991). In fairness, some applicants have appeared "one step removed" from
the litigation. See Chayes, supra note 13, at 1292. That does not necessarily mean that they
should be barred from intervening. See infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., 39.36 Acres and Kelley, discussed supra notes 144-52 and accompanying
text. Indeed, many courts link standing to interest and inadequate representation, often seeming to employ the following colloquial formulation: an applicant has no standing to complain
that its interests are being prejudiced when it is adequately represented, especially by the
government. The majority and concurring opinions iil Diamond, 476 U.S. 54, 7f (O'Connor,
J., concurring), convey that impression. See also United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 902
F.2d 213, 217-19 (2d Cir. 1990). These uses of standing, especially to amend Rule 24(a)(2)
informally or as a surrogate for other components of the Rule, although perhaps understandable, are inadvisable. They essentially substitute a rather crude instrument for more appropriate ones, although I may be vulnerable to similar crititisms in my formulation of a preferable approach to intervention of right. See infra notes 196-257 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Manasota-88, 896 F.2d at 1321-23; Keith, 764 F.2d at 1268-71.
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B. Standing as Irrelevant

This is not to say that clearer explanations have been provided by
the vast majority of judges who have failed to mention standing in
their intervention decisionmaking and the small 'number stating that
standing should have limited or no relevance. Of course, judges writing
the thousands of opinions that omit any reference to standing offer
little justification for their silence, and that silence does not necessarily
mean that the courts found standing irrelevant or even considered the
issue. Nevertheless, the sheer volume of cases that do not allude to
standing may testify to the minimal relevance that standing should
receive, while silence in many of the opinions could fairly be interpreted
as indicating judges' belief that standing was irrelevant.
The relatively few courts that have explicitly found standing irrelevant or of limited relevance to intervention have been no more
expansive than judges who invoke standing. Trbovich, discussed earlier,
could be read as an implicit rejection by the Supreme Court of the
application of standing to intervention of right, and an analogous allusion appears in the Court's 1980 decision, Bryant v. Yellen. 166 Similarly, in Diamond, the m(:\jority's phrasing of the relevant question as
whether applicants "must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule
24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Article III," and its observation
that Dr. Diamond might have relied on the state's standing, had Illinois
chosen to appeal, could be endorsements of intervention at the trial
court level by entities without standing. 167 Nonetheless, the Court's
express reservation for future decision of the standing question in Diamond probably should be interpreted as the most recent indication of
the Court's belief that it has yet to resolve the issue. 168
Lower federal court treatment also has been comparatively terse.
Some judges have asserted that an "intervenor need not have the standing necessary to initiate the lawsuit" 169 or that the "intervention re166.. 447 U.S. 35i (1980); see also supra note 127 and accom'!anying text; supra note
131.
167. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 64, 68-69; see also Bandes, supra note 11, at 254;
Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. M1cH. J.L.REF. 647, 661-62,
668 (1988). '
'
168. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68-69; cf Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717,
1724 ( 1990) (characterizing Court's rejection in Diamond of physician's attempt to defend
state law restricting abortions because fewer abortions would lead to more paying patients
on basis that" 'unadon~ed speculation' insufficient to invoke the federal judicial power").
169. Indian River Recovery Co. v. The China, 108 F.R.D. 383, 386 (D. Del. 1985);
Avery v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 312, 316 n. 3 (D. Mass. 1984); accord Purnell v. City of
Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 948 (6th Cir. 1991); Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 1979);
USPS v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Imperial Irrigation
Dist., 559 F.2d 509, 521 (9th Cir. 1977); Evans v. Buchanan, 130 F.R. D. 306, 310 n. 5 (D.
Del. 1990).
.
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quirements are more liberal than those for standing." 170 These courts
have provided little substantiation for their pronouncements, often citing only to case precedent. 171 Panels of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
recently refused to require that potential intervenors demonstrate
standing, although both courts stated that standing implicates Rule
24(a)(2). 172

Judges from the Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits and
elsewhere have recognized or emphasized the difference between what
entities must show to institute federal court litigation and to intervene
of right in an ongoing case. 173 For example, Judge David Bazelon,
writing for the District of Columbia Circuit, stated that "in the context
of intervention the question is not whether a lawsuit should be begun,
but whether already initiated litigation should be extended to include
additional parties." 174 Concomitantly, the judges have partially premised their determinations that intervention applicants need not have
standing on the existence of a case or controversy between the plaintiffs
and the defendants. 175
Despite the rather limited judicial treatment, there is considerable
support for the courts' refusal to invoke standing to deny intervention.
The history and judicial application of standing and intervention of
right show that they had different origins and were intended to serve
dissimilar, albeit not totally distinct, purposes. 176 As discussed earlier,
standing involves certain constitutional and prudential requirements
that courts impose on those wishing to commence suit.· Intervention
of right involves what judges demand of entities seeking to join litigation already initiated, before the court makes a substantive decision
170. See 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d at 861 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); United States v. Bd.
of School Comm'rs, 446 F.2d 573, 577, (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909 (1973).
See generally supra note 160 and accompanying text.
171. Purnell, 925 F.2d at 948; Wynn, 599 F.2d at 196; USPS, 579 F.2d at 190; Imperial
Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d at 521; Evans, 130 F.R.D. at 310 n. 5; Indian River Recovery Co.,
i08 F.R.D. at 386; Avery, 584 F. Supp. at 316 n. 3.
i 72. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308 n. i (9th Cir. 1989);
Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 12 i2-i3 (11th Cir. i 989).
173. See supra note 160. indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged the "distinction
between intervention and initiation" in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528,
536 n. 7 (1972). Cf United States v. $129,374 in United States Currency, 769 F.2d 583,586
(9th Cir. 1985) (district court erroneously confused standing and Rule 24's intervention
requirements).
i 74. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969); accord Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d i82, 184 (7th Cir. 1982); independent Petrochemical Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 105 F.R.D. 106, 110 (D.D.C. 1985).
175. See, e.g., Chiles, 865 F.2d at i2i2-i3; Brennan, 579 F.2d at i90; New York
State Energy Research & Dev. Auth. v. Nuclear Fuel Servs., 34 Fed. R. Serv. 2d i377, i378
(W.D.N.Y. 1982).
176. See supra notes 44-1 i3 and accompanying text.
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that might adversely affect the applicants. Numerous courts and commentators have convincingly contended that there is little, if any, reason
to demand standing ofan absentee in this situation, because the plaintiff
has satisfied the case or controversy requirement, the judicial machinery has been mobilized, and the applicant should be permitted to have
its say prior to entry of a potentially prejudicial order. 177 Neither the
phrasing of Rule 24(a)(2) nor its underlying policies support imposition
of the standing requirements. Moreover, the application of standing is
inadvisable for numerous policy reasons. For instance, the desirability
of full and fair public access to the federal courts, the judiciary's need
for the experience, data, viewpoints and arguments that will enable it
to reach the best determinations, and considerations of judicial economy strongly argue against invoking standing as courts have.
Many of these ideas and others apply with special force when
public interest litigants seek to intervene in public law litigation, especially institutional reform cases. 178 Much of this litigation will present
complex questions of law, implicating constitutional and statutory interpretation; complicated issues of fact, relating to technology, science
and economics; and difficult problems of policy, involving management
of large ·bureaucracies and trade-offs among competing interests for
scarce societal resources. 179 Moreover, the governmental or private activity at issue and the judicial decision responding to it often will be
controversial and will have unclear impacts that affect large numbers
of people, many of whom will not be parties to the litigation. 180 In
these situations, judges, who are generalists, will need a broad range of
expertise, information and perspectives to render the most accurate
determinations. 181 These factors are peculiarly applicable to institu177. See, e.g., Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1212-13; Smuck, 408 F.2d at 178; Shapiro, supra
note 95, at 726. Several sharply divided opinions could be read to suggest that the Supreme
Court may be unwilling to expand the size of a suit, a part of which will continue because
it meets Article Ill. Different majorities of the Court apparently bClieve that the new part
needs an independent justification, although it satisfies the Federal Rules. See Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978);
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. I ( 1976). These cases indicate that some justices may view
certain of the propositions differently. However, the Court has not applied the differing
approach above to the precise concepts treated here. Moreover, Congress recently altered
Finley. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5113
(1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990)).
178. I rely most here on Tobias, supra note 4, at 279-83, 328-29.
179. See id. at 279-83; supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 732 F.2d 452, 47375 (5th Cir. 1984) (Williams, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Morial v. United Gas Pipe
Line, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984). See Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. REv. 244 (1977) (valuable description
of these phenomena in the concrete context of a real dispute); cf. Rhode, Class Conflicts in
Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982) (problems of representation).
181. See, e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1272 (7th Cir., 1985) (Cudahy, J.,
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tional reform litigation, particularly during its remedial phase, when
courts are attempting to formulate workable structural decrees that will
improve the functioning of substantial governmental entities and which
will affect many individuals and institutions. 182 The judges must have
the views of those intimately familiar with the bureaucracies, persons
whose cooperation probably will be essential to the efficacious implementation of any order entered. 183 In institutional reform, and much
additional public law, litigation, citizen participation in the. form of
intervention might promote governmental accountability for its
decisionmaking 184 and could make both the governmental decision and
the judicial determination more palatable to those who must live with
them. 185 Involvement in litigation also can foster a sense of community
and may have certain intrinsic value, 186 and permitting that participation can manifest the judicial system's respect for the worth of persons. 181
In short, numerous federal circuit and district judges have made
standing important to their enforcement of Rule 24(a)(2). Most of the
ways that courts have applied standing in resolving intervention requests have been unnecessary, if not improper, causing confusion and
hardship, especially for public interest litigants. The next section, therefore, offers suggestions for future treatment of standing and of intervention of right.
dissenting); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Co., 749 F.2d 968, 990 (2d Cir. 1984).
Moreover, governmental litigants have "no monopoly on what constitutes the public interest
or on how to represent it most effectively in specific contexts." Tobias, supra note 4, at 329.
For a compelling example of these phenomena, see 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d at 861 (Cudahy,
J., dissenting).
182. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990). See also Yeazell,
supra note 180.
183. See Note, Institutional Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Pr<>cess, 91 YALE L.J. 1474 (1982). See also Thornburg, Litigating the Zero Sum Game: The
Effect ofInstitutional Reform Litigation on Absent Parties, 66 OR. L. REv. 843, 877-79 (I 987).
184. See. e.g., Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir.
1986) (National Park Service admitted violating own regulations and National Environmental
Policy Act when it allowed mining in Alaska's national parks).
185. For more discussion of public ·acceptability .of and accountability for governmental decisions, see Cramton, The Why, Where and How ofBroadened Public Participation
in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525 (1973); Furrow, Governing Science: Public
Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1422-24 (1983).
186. For discussion of community, see Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 TermForeword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Sunstein, Participation, Public
Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 976, 995 n.88 (1982); cf Mashaw, Administrative
Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv. 885, 902-04 (1981) (intrinsic
value).
.
187. Many commentators have expressed this idea. A prominent example is R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-39 ( 1979). For research that explores the meaning
of, and values intrinsic to, participation in modern.courtroom processes, see Burbank, supra
note 40, at 1466-71; Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right
to Protect One's Rights-Part 1, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

A. Introductory Consideration of Standing
As discussed above, the federal judiciary's invocation of standing
to resolve intervention of right' requests has been inadvisable. Demanding that potential intervenors possess standing and substituting
standing or certain of its elements for the interest or other Rule 24(a)(2)
criteria have been unwarranted in nearly all situations. Applicants
should be required to have standing or to comply with some standing
component in very few circumstances. One clear instance in which
standing would be appropriately invoked is the peculiar factual context
· presented by Diamond v. Charles. The Supreme Court instructed that,
when neither the plaintiff nor the defendant in the court below chooses
to appeal to the Supreme Court, an intervenor in the lower court must
have standing to continue the lawsuit. 188 This determination did not
mean, however, that the intervenor must have satisfied standing to
intervene of right at the district court level. 189
Another situation that might require standing is when an applicant
wants to vindicate claims that the plaintiff and the defendant do not
assert. Some courts apparently invoke standing to deny intervention
in this context, 190 although a few judges and commentators have stated
that an applicant satisfying the criteria of Rule 24(2)(a) should be permitted to intervene and pursue its claims. 191 Corre~pondingly, public
interest litigants typically seek relief similar to the party on whose side
they wish to intervene. Even when public interest litigants request different relief at the remedial stage, they probably 4o not need standing,
because the court has made the liability determination and needs all
the relevant input it can secure to fashion efficacious relief. 192
188. See Diamond v. Charles, 4 76 U.S. 54, 68-69 ( 1986).
189. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
190. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989). See
generally Washington Elec. Coop. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 F.2d
92, 97 (2d Cir. 1990); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 433-34 (D.C. Cir.
1989); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185-89 (7th Cir. 1982)~
191. See, e.g., Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822,
827 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 376·U.S. 944 (1964); FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1921,
at 492-502. But see N.Y. Central R. Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 944, 949 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). A few judges and writers who find that intervenors can assert new claims seem to rely
on the proposition that successful applicants become parties. See Diamond v. Charles, 476
U.S. 54, 68 (1986); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 541 n.15 (1970); see also FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1920, at 487-92; cf. Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213
n.17 (11th Cir. 1989) (recognizing but refusing to rule on standing issue in this context).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1986); see also supra notes 181-83 and
accompanying text. See generally Bandes, supra note 11, at 254-55, 312-13.
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Courts have less reason to demand standing of applicants that
promise to raise new issues for resolution, as they have already mobilized the judicial machinery. 193 Intervention of right has been characterized as an "exercise of federal ancillary jurisdiction," 194 which
allows participation by entities that lack independent jurisdiction. Virtually no courts, however, have imposed jurisdictional requirements
on applicants, especially public interest litigants, apparently because
there is an existing case or controversy between the plaintiffs and the
defendants. 195 In short, judges rarely sh.ould apply standing as they
have to Rule 24(a)(2).
B. The Preferable Approach to Intervention of Right.
1. EXPLANATION OF THE PREFERABLE APPROACH

Standing is crucial, nevertheless, to the intervention inquiry. 196
The policies that underlie standing help to define the idea of a case and
to designate proper entities to participate in lawsuits. A case is a device
for fostering the federal courts' performance of their preeminent duties:
enunciating public norms in the Constitution and legislation and encouraging compliance with the law. The party composition oflitigation,
therefore, should encompass the individuals and groups that can enable
the judiciary to fulfill those responsibilities. These 'factors mean that
in considering intervention requests courts should treat as paramount
applicants' potential contributions to issue resolution.
193. See, e.g.. Oregon, 839 F.2d at 638; Sagebrush Rebellion, lnc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d
525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Shapiro, supra note 95, at 754-55. But see Torrington Co.
v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 1073 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1990). See generally supra note 177.
194. Bandes, supra note JI, at 311-12. See also c. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL
COURTS§ 75, at 506 (4th ed. 1983).
195. My research revealed virtually no cases that mentioned jurisdiction. See Bandes,
supra note 11, at 252 n. 161 (currently "lower courts rarely discuss why" independent jurisdictional basis for applicants might or should not be required so treatment of ancillary jurisdiction's relevance does not occur); cf. Shapiro, supra note 95, at 726-27 (intervention does
not raise jurisdictional questions, if plaintiff has standing). A closely split majority of the
Supreme Court recently suggested that supplemental jurisdiction is much narrower than it
had previously indicated. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). Congress altered
Finley in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. See supra note 177; see also H.R. REP.
No. 101-734, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., 28-29 (I 988), reprinted in 1990 U.S. CoDE CONG. ADMIN.
NEws at 7874-75. The statute minimally affects the issue in the text and others in this Article.
Nearly ail public law litigation is premised on federal question jurisdiction, while exceptions
from the statute in Rule 24 govern cases based solely on diversity of citizenship.
196. I rely substantially in this paragraph and in much of this subsection on Professor
Bandes' valuable, recent work. See Bandes, supra note 11, especially at 227-35, 250-55, 31114. I also draw on my earlier work on public interest litigants and the Federal Rules; see
Tobias, supra note 4; Tobias, supra note 5, and on public participation in agency proceedings,
see Tobias, supra note 6.

1991:415

Standing to Intervene

447

The essential intervention inquiry should be whether an applicant
promises to help resolve issues that warrant consideration before the
court makes a decision on the merits of the dispute. This may be
ascertained by examining numerous relevant factors that comprise particular factual contexts. Although the significance of these considera:
tions will vary, thus necessitating case-specific ana~ysis, it is possible
to identify the factors that will be most important and to afford a sense
of how to treat them. 197
'.
The most significant consideration is the potential quality of the
applicant's proposed participation. Is the applicant likely to provide
expertise, information, or legal or policy per~pectives that contribute
to a court's understanding of questions already in issue? Correspondingly, will the applicant raise, and help resolve, new questions that the
judge should consider? An example may be found"in litigation challenging administrative agency decisionmaking that could have a significant impact on many consumers of a specific product or on employees of a chemical manufacturer. In such a context, a public interest
litigant-which has run experimental tests on the product or chemicals
in the workplace and whose members used that product or were exposed to the chemical-may enable the court to appreciate exactly how
the agency determination and the judge's ultimate decision reviewing
that determination will affect those individuals. 198 This type of potentially valuable involvement contrasts with the participation of applicants that will only offer experience or viewpoints that the plaintiff or
the defendant supply, will merely introduce a substantial quantity of
marginally relevant data, or will simply seek to inject issues that are
not germane. 199
A court may want to analyze whether, and if so how much, the
applicant's involvement promises to improve its substantive decisionmaking. For instance, will the potential intervenor help give specificity
to a Statutory standard that asks which agency choice will best effectuate
the "public interest"?200 Correspondingly, is the applicant likely to pro197. For somewhat similar treatment in the context of compulsory party joinder, see
Tobias, supra note 5, at 769-92. The treatment below relies partially on administrative practice
and procedure and public participation in agency proceedings. Many of these concepts are
transferable from the administrative sphere to courtroom litigation. Moreover, reliance on
these ideas comports with certain realities in much public law litigation, especially the notions
that judges are "quasi-administrative" decisionmakers who need the most accurate input to
render the best determinations. See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D.
408 (D. Minn. 1972); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 806 F.2d 1071, 1073, 1078-80 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
199. For examples drawn from abortion litigation, see Tobias, supra note 132, at,
732-34, 757 n. 163; infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text; cf Tobias, supra note 6, at
946-47 (examples derived from public participation in agency proceedings).
200. This is what the plaintiffs sought to do in the classic case of Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Cf. Tobias,
supra note 6, at 942 n. 210 (example in governmental agency context).
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vide facts that other participants do not or cannot, thereby increasing
the court's understanding of how challenged governmental practices
allegedly injure citizens .or violate pertinent constitutional commands?201
A court may encounter difficulty assessing if, and precisely how
much, a potential intervenor will enhance the quality of judicial determinations. Moreover, insisting that an applicant's input contribute
substantially to the lawsuit's ultimate disposition is too demanding.
Thus, the most appropriate inquiry remains whether the potential intervenor's participation promises to help the court take into account,
view differently, or reconsider relevant issues. 202
Once the court evaluates what the applicant will offer, it should
permit intervention by an applicant that clearly will contribute to issue
resolution, unless the involvement will impose und\le costs on the judicial system or the original parties, and, even then, the judge should
seriously consider allowing intervention and conditioning it. 203 If the
court is less certain that an applicant will facilitate issue resolution, the
judge should estimate as accurately as possible the value of the applicant's projected participation and attempt to ascertain the disadvantages, especially in terms of expenditures of time, money and effort,
that intervention will occasion for the civil justice system and the existing litigants. 204
.
An important consideration in many cases will be how much the
intervention is likely to delay the dispute's resolution, potentially undermining judicial economy and prejudicing parties. The court might
want to consult the nature of the applicant's involvement, what form
the participation will assume, at which stage of the litigation the involvement will occur, and how much it promises to complicate the
lawsuit. For example, will such a substantial amount of data be tendered
or the information be so tangentially related to the central questions
in dispute that the material inundates the judge, obfuscating, rather
than clarifying, the issues and protracting the litigation? 205
201. I mean here an applicant's possible provision of the factual predicate in cases
involving civil rights or the behavior of law enforcement officials. See generally Meltzer,
supra note 81; Tobias, supra note 8.
202. This is similar to the standard that I have suggested should govern awards of
participant compensation in agency processes. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 950.
203. "An intervention of right ... may be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the
proceedings." FED. R. C1v. P. 24 advisory committee's note; see also Shapiro, supra note 95,
at 761-62; infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
204. Both the value and costs will be difficult to estimate. See Tobias, supra note 5,
at 765 n. I05 (sources on litigation's costs); Brunet, A Study in the Allocation ofScarce Judicial
Resources: The Efficiency ofFederal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 70 I (1978) (helpful
example of how to estimate value and costs).
205. For a thorough analysis of these problems in the administrative and courtroom
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The. court then should informally balance the benefits and disadvantages of granting intervention. 206 This task is problematic, principally because it is virtually impossible to assign values to the relevant
considerations in a way that permits refined comparison. Discerning
whether certain factors should be treated as benefits or costs may be
difficult. For instance, if an applicant will provide much new data or
offer incisive insights on contested legal issues, those contributions
should be deemed advantages, but the submissions might be considered
disadvantages, if they were to prolong the dispute's disposition. 207 Even
when the court can identify benefits and costs with. comparative ease,
assigning the advantages and disadvantages precise values and balancing them, when appropriate, may be problematic. For example, exactly
how much weight should a judge accord to an applicant's proposed
input that probably will enhance somewhat the court's appreciation of
certain pertinent, but non-critical, issues in comparison with the apparently significant, although ultimately indeterminate~ expenditures of
time that the judge and the litigants must devote to the intervention.
Despite these complications, many circumstances will be clear, and
courts should be able to make accurate estimates in numerous others.
For instance, if an applicant appears likely to contribute much to issue
resolution, this should outweigh all but the greatest disadvantages. In
contrast, if a potential intervenor promises to submit a large quantity
of irrelevant material or to consume considerable :time, delaying the
dispute interminably, intervention probably should be denied or severely conditioned.
The problems, especially the difficulty of making the assessments
with exacting precision, mean that in situations where the advantages
and disadvantages seem relatively comparable, and even in some circumstances when intervention is more clearly warranted, the court
should consider the possibility of conditioning intervention. The judge,
in close cases thus may want to grant intervention motions rather flexibly but adjust the participation permitted to factors, such as the court's
perceptions of its need for the intervenors' decisional input, the pocontext, with citations to relevant examples, see Stewart, supra note 46, at 1770-81. The
nature and extent of delay is a controversial question in both contexts. See Resnik, supra
note 21, at 520-21, 559-60 (courtroom); Tobias, supra note 6, at 947. n. 240 (administrative).
206. I essentially use "cost" and "disadvantage" synonymously. I am not, however,
advocating a strict "cost benefit analysis," but rather the type of informal balancing Rule
I 9(b) requires. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 779-92.
207. Nonetheless, delay which is attributable to the submission of novel information
or new arguments that improve a judicial decision cannot fairly be characterized as detrimental. Correspondingly, inaccurate judicial determinations which are premised, for example,
on too little data can be very expensive, by leading to unnecessary appeals or the unwarranted
expenditure of resources to comply with the judicial mandate. See Tobias, supra note 6, at
945 n.229, 953.
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tential quality of contributions, and the time required and available to
treat the involvement.
There are inany specific ways of conditioning any intervention
allowed. For example, a judge could exclude an applicant's information
that apparently will duplicate data the original parties would offer or
may require cooperation among multiple applicants that will adopt
similar policy positions or appoint a representative to speak for
them. 208 A court may also impose restrictions that track the stages of
litigation. The judge may use a scheduling order to condition an intervenor's pretrial involvement, might restrict the direct testimony an
intervenor can present or the cross-examination it can conduct during
trial, or could permit participation only during the remedial phase. 209
The court may even limit involvement to certain types of issues, such
as legal questions. For instance, in litigation challenging the constitutionality of a federal or state statute, implicating issues of constitutional
or statutory interpretation, the judge might restrict applicant participation to those questions, thus effectively making the intervenor an
amicus curiae. 210

2.

APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH

A better understanding of the above-described approach may be
afforded by applying it in the concrete context of one of the most
difficult intervention cases. Diamond v. Charles, as discussed earlier,
presented the questions of whether the trial judge should have granted
Dr. Diamond's request, premised principally on his status as a pediatrician opposed to abortions and as the father of a minor daughter, to
intervene of right in litigation brought by other physicians challenging
the constitutionality of a restrictive Illinois abortion statute. 211 A ma208. The classic example is United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408,
417-20 (D. Minn. 1972).
209. For helpful discussion and citation to relevant cases, see United States v. South
Aa. Water Management Dist, 922 F.2d,704, 707, 710-11 (11th Cir. 1991); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 529, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1983) (Wallace, J., dissenting). See
also Tobias, supra note 132, at 747.
210. See Tobias, supra note 132, at 764-65 (propriety of this type of judicial treatment
in context ofabortion litigation); cf Shapiro, supra note 95, at 752-56, 759 (proposing concept
of "litigating amicus").
211. The Supreme Court aptly describes one difficulty with the case:
The District Court did not indicate whether the intervention was permissive or as
of right, and it did not describe how Diamond's interests in the litigation satisfied
the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 for intervenor status.
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 58 ( 1986); cf Tobias, supra note 132, at 732-33 (additional
information on Dr. Diamond's participation in Illinois abortion litigation). Of course, the
district judge will never have perfect information in the sense of knowing before the fact
exactly what applicants will contribute.
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jority of the Supreme Court reserved this question for future decision,
although it dismissed Diamond's appeal to the Court on the basis of
standing. 212 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, observed that
the government alone has an interest in enforcing its legislation, and
he characterized Diamond's interest in securing more patients as overly
speculative, his interest in physicians' standards as too generalized, his
interest in protecting his minor daughter as a third party claim, and
his interest in fetal rights as one only the state could assert. 213
The concurring opinion found that Diamond's alleged interests
fell "well outside the ambit of Rule 24(a)(2) [which requires] a direct
and concrete interest that is afforded some degree of legal protection. "214 Justice O'Connor considered "Diamond's speculative claim
that his practice" might benefit from the abortion law a "highly contingent financial interest, far less tangible than that of the taxpayer in
Donaldson," found his interests as a parent and a father indistii:iguishable from those of all beneficiaries of criminal statutes, and concluded
that "only the State has a 'significantly protectable interest' in" defending its criminal law. 215
The majority and concurring opinions facilitate understanding of
the interests Diamond sought to assert and of th.e justices' views of
their relevance to standing and intervention. However, the majority
and concurring opinions have limited applicability to the appropriate
inquiry: whether Diamond could contribute to issue resolution. 216
Whether Diamond's interest was generalized, speculative, or contingent, for example, does not answer, and has little relevance to, that
inquiry. 211
The relative paucity of material available, especially regarding precisely what Dr. Diamond might have contributed,' complicates thorough application of the suggested approach. Nonetheless, there is sufficient information to afford a sense of how a trial judge might apply
.

212. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68-71.
213. See id. at 64-69.
214. See id. at 71, 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
215. See id. at 76.
216. For helpful analysis of the issues relevant to whether Diamond should have
been permitted to appeal, see Bandes, supra note 11, at 314.
217. I am simply saying that there may be little correlation between an applicant's
technical "interest" in litigation and that applicant's ability to contribute to issue resolution.
The Supreme Court majority and concurring opinions also seem to emphasize the idea that
only the state has an interest in prosecuting a person for violating its criminal law or in the
enforcement of its legislation. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 64-65, 76. The preferable way of
phrasing the inquiry is to ask whether an applicant can contribute to issue resolution, or if
the interest concept is considered relevant, whether an applicant has an interest in defending
the constitutionality of a challenged statute.

452

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

the approach advocated here to the physician's intervention motion. 218·
Dr. Diamond, as a licensed, practicing pediatrician, apparently could
have provided experience, data, or viewpoints arguably relevant to the
district court litigation challenging the abortion legislation.
Several opposing factors, however, dilute the strength of his apparent ability to contribute. Close scrutiny of the major questions at
issue in the lawsuit reveals that they principally involved questions of
constitutional and statutory interpretation. These are areas in which
the Illinois Attorney General and the Cook County State's Attorney,
both statutorily required to defend the legislation's constitutionality,
would have special expertise and Diamond would be unlikely to have
much relevant experience. 219 Even as to some of the more tangential
questions, such as how abortions are conducted, Diamond would have
had little to offer, because he was opposed to abortions and presumably
did not perform them. In short, Dr. Diamond probably would have
provided minimal pertinent expertise, little relevant information, and
few insights that the parties did not promise to supply.
A judge, analyzing these factors, could reasonably make a prelim"'
inary determination that the applicant would not contribute to issue
resolution. Were the court to reach that conclusion, it would end the
inquiry and deny intervention of right. Even if the judge initially decided that an applicant may somehow contribute, the court should then
consider the potential costs of permitting intervention.
At this juncture, the judge might properly consult some factors
gleaned from the controversial history of Illinois abortion litigation. A
review of that litigation reveals that Dr. Diamond had actively participated in a number of cases since the mid-l 970s, that he had made few
substantive contributions to the resolution of pertinent questions, that
he was not paying the costs of participating in certain suits, 220 and that
he was willing to prolong for a decade the litigation that bears his
name. 221 These considerations could lead the court to question Dia218. I rely most on all of the opinions issued in the Diamond litigation and on earlier
research I conducted on Dr. Diamond's participation in Illinois abortion litigation. See Tobias, supra note 132, at 732-33; see also Bandes, supra note 11, at 254-55.
219. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 14, para. 4, 5 (Smith-Hurd 1963 & Supp. 1989); see
also Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985); Tobias, supra note 132, at 760-61.
220. See Tobias, supra note 132, at 732 n.6 (documenting active participation); id.
at 757 n.163 and accompanying text (few contributions); see also Charles v. Daley, 799 F.2d
343, 345-48 (7th Cir. 1986) (Diamond not paying costs).
221. See Tobias, supra note 132, at 733-34. I realize that some ideas in this sentence
may not necessarily be seen as disadvantages. For example, active participation in abortion
litigation and prolonging one piece of it for ten years may display an admirable commitment
to the issue and "concrete adversity." Correspondingly, although Diamond's failure to pay
the costs of the litigation may evince a lack of commitment or a willingness to "spend someone
else's money," national entitities, like Diamond's counsel, the Americans United for Life
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mond's reasons for seeking intervention and even to suspect that he
was primarily interested in delay or in obstructing plaintiffs' efforts to
vindicate their rights to reproductive freedom. 222 • In any event, the
judge might find that the pediatrician's intervention would be too costly
for the justice system and for the original parties.
Another relevant factor that the judge could have considered is
the governmental defendants' commitment to defense of the legislation's constitutionality. In certain situations, applicants may have been
justifiably concerned about entrusting their hard-fought legislative victories to the vagaries of courtroom representation by defendants who
are, after all, elected officials. For instance, some observers accused
Illinois Attorney General Hartigan of prematurely :settling another Illinois abortion case, Turnock v. Ragsdale, and sacrificing the "public
interest" in stringent abortion regulation, to foster his own gubernatorial candidacy. 223 These considerations might lead a court to question
the strength of the defendants' commitment to defending the statute,
a factor that may warrant comparison with the advantages and disadvantages of Diamond's participation.
In short, an informal balancing of the advantages and disadvantages indicates that the coi>ts· of allowing Dr. Diamond's participation
would have been greater. Intervention could have entailed significant
disadvantages, especially in terms of time expenditures, with little
promise that the applicant would have contributed substantially to the
resolution of any relevant issues in the case. Moreover, the governmental defendants had considerable expertise as to the most important
questions, although they arguably.lacked.sufficient commitment to the
defense of the legislation. These factors would seem to favor the denial
of intervention or perhaps permitting severely conditioned participation or amicus involvement on certain issues as hedge against the
possibility of lukewarm governmental defense. 224

a

Legal Defense Fund, and the ACLU, typically finance much of the "local" abortion litigation.
This representation also illustrates that Diamond might have possessed special legal expertise
that was not otherwise apparent. I realize as well that what an applicant promises to contribute
should be more imPortant than prior participation, although the latter certainly has relevance
in this context.
'
222. This apparently has been true of some Illinois abortion litigation and certainly
has been true of such litigation in other states. See, e.g., Akron Center for Reproductive
Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ohio 1984); see also Tobias, supra note
132, at 734.
223. SeeTumock v. Ragsdale, 492 U.S. 916 (1989) Uuris. postponed); see also Illinois
Accord Approved, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1990, Al2, Col. I. The reason why Dr. Diamond
appealed to the Supreme Court was, after all, that the State of Illinois chose not to appeal.
See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 56.
224. For an analysis that reaches similar conclusions while. recognizing the benefits
and disadvantages that are implicated, see Tobias, supra note 132, _at 758-65.
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3.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE APPROACH

This approach is preferable and the federal judiciary should implement it for many reasons. Perhaps the most compelling reason is
that many judges actually have already applied all elements of the
approach in their intervention of right decisionmaking. Several influential judges candidly recognized that Rule 24(a)(2) has a discretionary
dimension, and some courts have exercised this discretion. Indeed,
Judge Bazelon, joined by Judge Leventhal and Judge Spottswood Robinson, remarked that "while the division of Rule 24 (a) and (b) into
'Intervention of Right' and 'Permissible Intervention' might superficially suggest that only the latter involves an exercise of discretion by
the court, the contrary is clearly the case." 225 Judge Henry Friendly,
observing that they "may well have been correct," acknowledged that
trial courts have considerable discretion under Rule 24(a)(2) and suggested that appellate judges defer to district courts with the "feel of the
case" when reviewing determinations on conditioning, litigation management, and intervention of right generally. 226
Numerous courts have also emphasized the contributions that applicants' expertise or perspectives might make to issue resolution and
to judicial decisionmaking, apparently recognizing_ the worth of intervention as a mechanism for information gathering and for improving
substantive determinations. 227 Some have considered the possible prejudice to litigants of permitting intervention, while others have found
party prejudice so significant that they incorporated i~ as a principal
component when elaborating a four-part timeliness test. 228 Additional
judges have acknowledged the validity and value of conditioning intervention, integrated that prospect into their Rule 24(a)(2) decisionmaking, or creatively conditioned intervenor participation. 229 Quite a
few courts that invoke party prejudice or condition involvement seem
225. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Accord Washington Elec.
Coop. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1990).
226. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 991 n.20 (2d Cir.
1984) (three judges may well have been correct); id. at 990-93 (remaining propositions); see
also Int'! Paper v. Town of Jay, 887 F.2d 338, 344 (I st Cir. 1989); accord FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 115, § 1913, at 375-76.
227. See, e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir. 1985) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983); Southeast
Alaska Conservation Council v. Watson, 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1983). But see
American Nat'! Bank & Trust v. City ofChicago,_865 F.2d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1989).
228. See, e.g.. Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (I Ith Cir. 1989); New Hampshire Insur. Co. v. Greaves, 110
F.R.D. 549, 552 (D.R.I. 1986). Cf Garrity v. Gallen, 697 F.2d 452, 458 (1st Cir. 1983) (undue
judicial expenditures relevant to timeliness); see also Note, The Timeliness Threat to Inter'
vention of Right, 89 YALE L.J. 586 ( 1980).
229. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380,
382-83 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring); United States v. South Fla. Water Management
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to find important intervention's potential disadvantages, namely delay.230
A substantial number of courts, in resolving intervention requests,
has carefully weighed the factors enumerated and other relevant considerations, balancing them as indicated. Many judges have deemphasized or relaxed the Rule's four express criteria, while some courts even
seem to have ignored certain of the requirements. For instance, a few
Ninth Circuit panels and additional judges have failed to mention the
interest condition or effectively read it out of Rule 24(a)(2). 231 Correspondingly, some members of the bench have accorded decreased significance to applicants' need to intervene. 232 Numerous judges have
employed such elastic tests of impairment, inadequate representation
or timeliness that they have practically eviscerated the criteria. 233
Others have imposed proof burdens so lenient or viewed potential
intervenors' showings with such sympathy that the applicants easily
satisfied the Rule's requirements. 234
The approach advocated here is a practical, equitable and sensitive
recalibration of the longstanding intervention device to the realities of
modem litigation. 235 The approach attempts to make Rule 24(a)(2)'s
application as responsive as possible to the needs of the principal participants in public law cases, namely public interest litigants, judges
and the· original parties. It recognizes the significance of, and attempts
to balance as fairly as possible, public interest litigants' strong interest
Dist., 922 F.2d 704, 707, 710-11 (I Ith Cir. 1991); Hooker Chems. & Plastics, 749 F.2d at 992
n. 22; Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 529, 530-31 (Wallace, J. dissenting); United States
v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 417-20 (D. Minn. 1972).
·
230. Indeed concern about the litigation explosion and for efficient operation of the
federal courts may be the very reason some courts invoked standing. See supra notes 16265 and accompanying.iext.
231. See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 528; cases cited supra note 134.
232. See, e.g., Manasota-88, Inc. v. Tidwell, 896 F.2d 1318, 1323 (I Ith Cir. 1990);
American Nat'/ Bank & Trust, 865 F.2d at 147.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826-28 (9th Cir. 1986)
(impairment and inadequate representation); Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep't oflnterior,
736 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1984) (inadequate representation); Hodge v. HUD, 862 F.2d
859 (I Ith Cir. 1989) (timeliness).
234. For examples of lenient proof burdens, see Stringfellow, 783 F.2d at 827; Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 528. For examples of sympathetic views of applicants' reasons
for delayed application, see Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1989); Chiles
v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (I Ith Cir. 1989). Some courts may be treating Rule
24(a)(2) as I say for reasons slightly different than those that I have suggested. For example,
the Ninth Circuit panels may deemphasize interest to accommodate their view that "Rule
24 is broadly construed in favor of applicants for intervention." Stringfellow, 783 F.2d at
827. Correspondingly, some courts that accord little significance to applicants' needs may be
doing so to protect public interest litigants as plaintiffs from delay that applicants could cause.
See, e.g., Manasota-88, 896 F.2d 1318.
235. See Bandes, supra note I I, at 250-55, 311-14; cf Marcus, supra note 167, at 664
(characterization ofJudge Lord's resolution of intervention of right questions in United States
v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972)).
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in participating when they seek to intervene, the federal judiciary's
growing concerns about the litigation explosion and its need for the
finest decisional information, and the existing parties' desire to minimize the expense of dispute resolution. 236
The adaptation effectuates the express requirements of Rule
24(a)(2) and their underlying policies, such as efficient litigation packaging, by, for example, including in one lawsuit as many interested
parties as can fairly and efficiently be accommodated. 237 It also implements the Advisory Committee's intent in drafting the 1966 amendment. The suggested approach clearly carries out the Committee's admonition that application be flexible and pragmatic while recognizing
that such enforcement is essential in public law cases, because the Committee crafted the revision primarily for private law litigation. 238 Judge
Leventhal and Judge Friendly explicitly espoused these ideas; they apparently appreciated the complications inherent in writing a rule that
would govern all types of litigation, especially cases that differed from
those prevalent in the 1960s, the problem of anticipating future developments in civil litigation, and the need to adjust Rule 24(a)(2)'s
application to the new circumstances presented by public law litigation. 239 Moreover, the approach effectuates the Advisory Committee's
professed intent in drafting the other two 1966 party joinder amendments, but an intent which it neglected to implement fully in Rule
24(a)(2): the provision of decisional factors, rather than definitional
categories, as guides for judicial disposition of party joinder questions. 240
The adaptation properly stresses those considerations, like the
need to provide federal courts with the best possible input, that should
have greatest importance. The approach appropriately deemphasizes
the factors that should receive reduced significance. For instance, as
interests sufficient to satisfy the Rule have become increasingly intangible and the importance of their private or common law character has
concomitantly diminished, some judges continued insistence on a traditional, concrete interest has become the modern-day search for property in the court's custody that the Advisory Committee abandoned in
1966 and that its Reporter and prominent judges criticized shortly
236. The approach is responsive to concerns about the litigation explosion, because
it seeks to reduce the possibility of multiple litigation and suggests that judges consider
conditioning the intervention granted.
237. See Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also supra note
136; infra notes 239, 242.
·
238. See supra notes 98, 105-08 and accompanying text.
239. See Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Hooker Chems.
& Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1984). There is some speculation involved in saying
what the judges appreciated; however, a fair reading of Nuesse and Hooker Chems. supports
the textual statement. The approach also honors the Committee's strong, explicit concerns
about judicial economy and efficient litigation packaging, evidenced specifically, for example,
in the Committee Note's recommendation that courts condition intervention.
240. See supra notes 95, 110 and accompanying text.
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thereafter. 241 Correspondingly, the approach ·recognizes the' decreased
significance that judges should attach to litigant autonomy. Plaintiffs·
pursuing litigation that implicates public values or that may practically
prejudice absentees cannot expect to exercise complete control over
their cases, to dictate the lawsuit's party structure, or to relegate public
interest litigants to separate, later litigation, even when the entities have
standing. 242
The reformulation essentially leaves intact numerous dimensions
of present Rule 24(a)(2) application. For example, the suggestion that
courts deny or limit intervention by applicants whose contributions
would duplicate parties' input implements the adequate representation
requirement and is sensitive to concerns· about judicial economy. 243
Moreover, the approach should clarify the Rule's enforcement, because
it suggests that those factors, which many courts ignore or treat implicitly or rarely, be applied more explicitly and more frequently. It
recommends, for instance, the express judicial consideration of party
prejudice and more routine conditioning. 244
The adjustment is advisable as a matter of public policy and implements important policies, in~luded in or derived from the language
or purposes of rules other than Rule 24(a)(2) and the Rules as a set of
litigating principles that courts invoke. The approach effectuates Rule
l's explicit command that the Rules be "construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action" 245 and significant policies drawn from the Rules as a whole, particularly their emphases on fairness, on merits-based conclusion of lawsuits, and on the
substance of disputes rather than procedural technicalities. 246 The 1983
amendments to the Rules lend additional support to this approach. 247
241. See supra text accompanying note 100; Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (1966 amendment eliminated "temptation or need for tangential expeditions
in search of 'property' "); see also supra note. 231 and accompanying text.
242. Indeed, efficient litigation packaging and preventing multiple litigation, both of
which reduce litigant autonomy, were important purposes of the 1966 amendment whose
significance has only increased over time. See Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking PlaintiffAutonomy and the Court's Role in De.fining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT.
L. REV. 809 (1989); McCoid, A Single Package For Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV.
707 (1976); see also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE,§ 6.10, at
366, 373 (1985); cf Bandes, supra note 11, at 312 (recognizing importance of adjudicating
constitutional issues requires reducing litigant autonomy).
243. An applicant whose contribution would be duplicative is adequately represented.
See generally supra note 208 and accompanying text.
244. Judges often seem to consider party prejudice sub si/entio. See generally supra
note 228 and accompanying text. The validity of conditioning is not entirely clear. See United
States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 992 n.22 (2d Cir. 1984); see also supra
note 229 and accompanying text.
245. FED. R. Clv. P. I.
246. See FED. R. Civ. P. I (fairness); Marcus, supra note 33, at 439 (merits-based
resolution);. c. CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE (1965) (fairness and emphasis on substance).
247. See A. MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
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The Advisory Committee, in revising Rules 7, 11, 16 and 26, meant
to revamp the process of federal civil litigation, streamlining it and
expediting dispute resolution. 248 The drafters sought to achieve these
goals by, for instance, enhancing judicial control over cases, especially
vis-a-vis lawyers, emphasizing that the civil justice system is a public
resource and decreasing litigant autonomy. The Committee, therefore,
intended to change the Federal Rules and the litigation process so fundamentally that certain precepts, such as intensive litigation management, which informed that effort should have applicability beyond the
provisions specifically amended to Rule 24(a)(2). 249
The approach implements evolving policy notions of the federal
courts as a public resource and of the proper judicial role in closely
managing cases and in acquiring necessary decisional input. It also
draws on transformed conceptualizations of the idea of a case and its
constituents. A case is both a mechanism for settling private disputes
and a vehicle for explicating public values and for preventing or correcting government illegality. 250 Its subject matter may be a government
decision, policy or practice, and the proper participants in a case are
those that can contribute best to issue resolution. Indeed, intervention
of right itself now functions not only as a device for protecting absentees
against practical prejudice but also as an important information-gathering mechanism for enhancing federal judicial decisionmaking. Thus,
it serves as a valuable complemeni to numerous, existing devices that
are addressed more explicitly to the judicial need for decisionmaking
input, such as the appointment of special masters or expert witnesses
or the designation of amici curiae. 251
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY
(1984).
248. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note. See generally A. MILLER,
supra note 247. For helpful discussion of how the Committee intended to change the Rules
and the litigation process fundamentally, see Burbank, The Transformation ofAmerican Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989); Subrin, supra..note 33.
I realize that the 1983 amendments and their application have been controversial since their
effective date. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 8. I also recognize that there are risks in placing
too much discretion in the federal judiciary, as some argue the 1983 amendments do and as
the approach proposed may. See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir.
1987); see also Burbank, supra; Burbank, supra note 39; Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the
1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 927 (1991). Congress
evinced strong concern about expediting dispute resolution as recently as its last session. See
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title I., 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (civil
justice expense and delay reduction plans).
249. For analogous ideas, see Goldberg, supra note 38, at 416-18; Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test
forSupplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1401, 1478-79 (1983).
250. See Bandes, supra note 11, at 281-89; Chayes, supra note 77, at 4. For discussion
of Supreme Court opinions that may suggest a different approach, see supra note 177.
251. See Brazil, supra note 20 (special masters); Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief:
From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 ( 1963 (amici); Chayes, supra note 13, at
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These new realities have deprived Rule 24(a)(2) of considerable
substance, diluting the applicability of the core concepts of interest,
impairment and inadequate representation, to most modem lawsuits.
The literal terms of the Advisory Committee's quarter-century old
amendment, aimed at private cases, simply cannot bind judges with
significantly altered responsibilities to resolve public law litigation.
When the essential character of much federal civil litigation changes
so dramatically, the courts must be able to treat the litigation efficaciously by adjusting existing Rules to the new circumstances. 252 Many
federal judges apparently have ascribed importance to similar phenomena in creating a "public rights exception" to compulsory party joinder
under Rule 19, one of the other two party joinder rules revised in
1966. 253 Finally, tbe approach effectuates good public policy for equitable, efficacious court administration by facilitating citizen participation in litigation. This involvement affords indiv:iduals and groups
the opportunity to be heard before judges enter decrees that might affect
them adversely, a concept inherent in the idea of equitable discretion,
and may increase public accountability for, and acceptance of, governmental decisionmaking. 254
Congress has expressly subscribed to these public policies. 255 For
example, it has enacted much legislation intended to promote the active
involvement of public interest litigants and other members of the public
in administrative proceedings and courtroom litigation. By generously
providing participatory possibilities, Congress clearly meant to expand
federal court access for previously excluded and underrepresented individuals and groups. 256 The many specific expressions of legislative
intent suggest that courts should apply analogous, more general pro1300-01 (other mechanisms). Intervention of right augments these devices; it does not replace
them.
252. Courts have similarly adjusted other rules. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 4, at
296-301 (Rule 8); id. at 332-33 (Rule 60(b)(5)); Tobias, supra note 5 (Rule 19); see also
Goldberg, supra note 38, at 416-18; Matasar, supra note 249, at 1478-79.
253. See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club
v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985). These courts recognize, for example, that
governmental decisions are the subject matter of public law litigation, that those decisions
affect thousands of geographically dispersed entities that public interest litigants cannot join
or whose joinder would unduly complicate their litigation, and that there would be losses in
governmental accountability were the claims dismissed. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 764-65.
254. See Marcus, supra note 167, at 668 (idea inherent in equitable discretion); supra
notes 182-83 and accompanying text (public accountability for and acceptance of governmental decisionmaking).
255. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
256. Congress afforded public interest litigants and citizens standing and intervention
rights in numerous particular substantive statutes, such as measures aimed at eliminating or
reducing discrimination and environmental pollution. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)(l982); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1986);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U .S.C. § 6972 (1982). See generally HoffmanLaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, ll 0 S. Ct. 482, 486-88 (1989).
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visions in the Federal Rules, such as Rule 24(a)(2), in ways that facilitate
the participation of public interest litigants and the broader.publjc. 257
C. Summary
In short, the letter and spirit of the Federal Rules. and the need
for efficient, well-informed judicial decisionmaking, support judicial
enforcement of present Rule 24(a)(2) in accord with the approach suggested. A number of judges may be uncomfortable with certain aspects
of the approach, finding that some facets conflict with their perceptions
of the proper judicial role or are otherwise inappropriate. 258 Quite a
few judges may consider the approach problematic, as it is insufficiently
attentive to the Rule's specific requirements. The approach suggests
that courts exercise discretion when applying a rule couched in mandatory terms, 259 deemphasize policies that underlie the express requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), 260 and stress concepts that are not explicitly included in the provision. 261 Judges, thus, might be troubled
because Rule 24(b)(2) expressly states that they are to exercise discretion
in resolving permissive intervention requests and makes party prejudice the exclusive criterion that courts must consider in doing so. 262
257. I am merely saying that the large number of specific expressions of legislative
intent strongly indicate that Congress favors expansive intervention and that this should
inform courts' application of Rule 24(a)(2). See also Sperling, 110 S. Ct. at 486-88. I· realize,
of course, that Rule 24(a)( 1) provides for statutory intervention of right and that Congress
could specifically prescribe intervention of right by regulatory beneficiaries in every substantive statute, but this is an unrealistic view of the legislative process, given, for instance, its
extremely fragmented nature and the shifting coalitions that coalesce to pass specific statutes.
Congress also has subscribed more recently to other policies that support the suggested
approach. Congress, by acquiescing in the 1983 amendments and by passing the Judicial
Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, for example, evinced concern about expeditious dispute
resolution and efficient litigation packaging.
258. One basis for objection might be that an aspect seems inconsistent with recent
Supreme Court opinions that view the idea of a case rather narrowly. See supra note 177.
259. "Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene .... "FED. R.
C1v. P. (24)(a)(2) (emphasis added).
260. This is especially so with regard to applicant need to intervene. See supra notes
223-24, 232, 236 and accompanying text.
261. Of particular import are contributions to issue resolution and party prejudice.
See supra notes 178-83, 197-205, 227-28 and accompanying text.
·
262. Rule 24 provides in pertinent part:
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: ... (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common ... In exercising its discretion the
court shall consider whether the intervention will unduiy delay or prejudice. the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
·
FED. R. C1v. P. 24 (b)(2). Judges could be concerned because they believe that the approach
might violate the Advisory Committee's intent when drafting Rule 24(a)(2) in 1966. Even if
the Committee revised the provision with Rule 24(b) in mind, it is not clear that the drafters
meant to divest judges of all discretion, and numerous courts have exercised discretion when
including party prejudice as an integral part of the timeliness test or in their intervention of
. right decisionmaking more generally. See supra notes 24-25, 228 and. accompanying text.
Although the drafters did not amend Rule 24(b) in 1966, it is fair to assume that they had
it in mind. See generally FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1911, at 355-56.
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Given the scope of the suggested changes, some judges may find them
so fundamental that the recommendations should only be effectuated
through the formal rule amendment process. 263 fodeed, when civil
rights plaintiffs recently championed a different, but not entirely inapposite, approach to Rule 24(a)(2), the Supreme Court responded that
the application advocated "would require a rewriting rather than an
interpretation of' Rules 24 and 19. 264
The Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee and Congress, therefore, should expeditiously revise Rule 24(a)(2) to conform with the
approach suggested here. Formal amendment would afford numerous
benefits. It would resolve any doubt about judicial authority to implement the approach espoused, permit full public discussion of the proposal's advisability and of other suggestions for improvement and their
revision as indicated, and offer the advantage of expressly including in
the provision any changes adopted. 265
Notwithstanding the need for Rule 24(a)(2)'s tevision or the advisability of the approach recommended, amendment appears unlikely
in the near future. For over a quarter century, the Advisory Committee
has manifested no interest in revision, despite considerable agreement
that Rule 24(a)(2) was flawed as amended, 266 while the Committee has
recently assigned higher priority to modifying other provisions, such
as Rule 11 covering sanctions and Rule 56 governing summary judgment. 267 Moreover, the Supreme Court has evinced little concern for
263. This is the process in which the Advisory Committee develops proposals, circulates them for public comment, and finalizes them for submissi~n to the Supreme Court
which, if it approves or modifies the Committee's recommendation and Congress does not
modify the Court's action, amends the Rule: See 28 U.s:c. §§ 2072-74 ( 1988); see also Lewis,
The Excessive History ofFederal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1507 (1987); Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991).
264. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 767 ( 1989). Plaintiffs asked the Court to require
absentees that might be adversely affected by entry of a consent decree in Title VII litigation
to intervene rather than require plaintiffs to join absentees under Rule 19. See generally
Grover, The Silenced Majority: Martin v. Wilks and the Legislaiive Response, (forthcoming
1991 U. ILL. L. REV.); Strickler, Martin v. Wilks, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1557 (1990).
265. Most of the public policies that support the suggested approach also support
courts' authority to implement it absent formal amendment. See, 'e.g., supra notes 255-57
and accompanying text (explicit indications of Congressional intent augment considerable
existing judicial authority mentioned in this piece); cf Chambers v,. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
2123 (1991) (courts have broad inherent authority to manage dockets even in certain areas
specifically covered by statute or federal rule); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,
871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (courts have broad implied power to manage their dockets).
But cf Comment, Mandatory Summary Jury Trial: Playing by the Rules?, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1495, 1510-13 ( 1989). Although the ideas analyzed strongly support the exercise of
authority, there are some relatively convincing arguments against its exercise. Nonetheless,
additional discussion is beyond·the scope of this piece.
266. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text (flawed as amended).
267. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CALL FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELATED RULES, reprinted in 131 F.R.D. 344
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public interest litigants in its recent opinions, 268 and neither the Com- .
mittee nor the Court has shown much interest in revising the Federal
Rules in ways that would be more solicitous of public interest litigants'
needs. 269 Although Congress has passed many substantive, procedural,
and fee-shifting statutes that facilitate the active involvement of public
interest litigants in federal civil litigation, 270 it rarely has been sufficiently interested to focus on the revision of one rule. 271
Because the Supreme Court and Congress are not likely to revise
Rule 24(a)(2) soon, the courts will have to resolve intervention requests
pursuant to the current Rule. In treating motions to intervene, judges
should follow the approach recommended above. Courts that disagree
with any aspects of the approach should selectively apply those elements they deem proper. For example, many courts probably will consider appropriate the recommendations that respond to the litigation
explosion, perhaps finding them logical extensions of the judicial economy concept, which clearly underlies Rule 24(a)(2). In contrast, the
possibility that a court might grant intervention to an applicant lacking
such an interest that could contribute substantially to issue resolution
( 1990) (possible amendment of Rule 11 ); COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, reprinted in 137
F.R.D. _ (1991).
268. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 ( 1989); see Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL.
L. REV. I 05, 122 ( 1991 ); Tobias, Certification and Civil Rights, 136 F.R.D. 223, 229-30 ( 1991 );
see also Tobias, supra note 4, at 317 n. 284.
269. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 301-14 (lack of solicitude for civil rights 'plaintiffs
in revising Rule 11 in 1983 and abortive attempts to amend Rule 68 in 1983 and 1984).
270. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
( 1982); see also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
271. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 293, 337-40. In 1983, Congress did reject the Court's
suggestions for revising Rule 4 and amended the provision statutorily. See Changes in Federal
Summons Service Under Amended Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 96 F.R.D.
81 (1983); cf Burbank, supra note 29, at 1018-20 (documenting increased Congressional
willingness since 1973 to intercept proposed rules and amendments governing evidence and
civil, criminal and appellate procedure). Congress also has evinced greater interest in the
rules revision process recently. See, e.g., Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642; H. R. REP. No. 100-889, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess.
22-27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5982, 5983-87. The civil
rights area affords two telling indications of why Congress is unlikely to revise· Rule 24.
Congress only recently showed interest in the 1983 amendment of Rule 11, although considerable evidence indicated that it was seriously disadvantaging civil rights plaintiffs. See
Tobias, supra note 8. Moreover, Congress was unable to override President Bush's veto of
the Civil Rights Act of 1990. This happened, even though the measure was a tepid version
of the bill initially introduced and had the nearly unanimous support of the powerful civil
rights lobby. Moreover, there was substantial need to reinstate Congressional intent that the
federal judiciary facilitate the vindication of fundamental civil rights by discrimination victims, an intent that narrow Supreme Court interpretations had eroded. See President's Veto
Of Rights "Measure Survives By One Vote, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1990, Al, col. 3; cf New
Battle Looming as Democrats Reintroduce Civil Rights Measure, N. Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1991
(strong, new legislation introduced in l02nd Congress).
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but deny intervention to an absentee having a traditional interest that
would contribute little may prove too much for a number of judges. 272
Courts that employ the aspects of the suggested approach with which
they agree should integrate that enforcement with application that is
tailored more specifically to the Rule's express terms and embodies the
intervention of right jurisprudence many courts have developed. 273
Even judges who reject the approach in its entirety should seriously
consider abandoning the inadvisable imposition of standing requirements criticized above while pragmatically applying the Rule's explicit
phrasing which affords sufficient flexibility to resolve intervention requests similarly to the suggested approach. 274
VI. CONCLUSION

Numerous federal circuit and district courts have required intervention applicants to satisfy standing or certain of its components.
Their invocation of standing has been inadvisable. Nonetheless, the
policies that underlie standing are integral to reformulating intervention
of right, because they help to define the idea of a case, the appropriate
parties to participate in it, and the proper judicial role in resolving
public law litigation. The approach to standing and to Rule 24(a)(2)
suggested here is a pragmatic, equitable recalibration of the intervention
procedure to the realities of modern lawsuits. If courts apply it, they
will at once enhance the quality of their decisionmaking and realize
judicial economy.

272. I am not advocating these results, although they could occur, albeit rarely, under
the approach suggested.
273. See supra notes 225-34 and accompanying text. The way courts integrate the
enforcement will depend on many considerations, such as how many, and which, aspects of
the approach they want to apply, how flexibly they wish to enforce the Rule's four requirements, and the facts that are present in specific contexts. For instance, a judge who agrees
with the central facets of the approach might grant intervention to an applicant that promised
to contribute greatly to issue resolution, especially if there were some prospect of inadequate
representation. See generally United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 983
(2d Cir. 1984). In comparison, a judge who is less enamored of the approach may want to
apply the Rule's requirements in light of the approach, perhaps finding sufficient, for example,
the type of intangible interest public interest litigants frequently assert. See supra notes 11,
I00-02 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 98, I00-02, 225-26 and accompanying text. These judges might
wish, for instance, to read the Rule's criteria literally and apply parts of the approach only
when the four criteria yield unclear conclusions.

